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SEQUENCING THE ISSUES FOR JUDICIAL DECISIONMAKING:
LIMITATIONS FROM JURISDICTIONAL PRIMACY AND
INTRASUIT PRECLUSION
Kevin M Clermont*
This Article treats the order of decision on multiple issues in a single
case. That order can be very important, with a lot at stake for the court,
society, and parties. Generally speaking, although the parties can control
which issues they put before a judge, the judge gets to choose the
decisional sequence in light of those various interests.
The law sees fit to put few limits on the judge's power to sequence. The
few limits are, in fact, quite narrow in application, and even narrower if
properly understood. The Steel Co.-Ruhrgas rule generally requires a
federal court to decide Article III justiciability and subject-matter
jurisdiction before ruling on the merits. The Beacon Theatres-Dairy Queen
rule requires a federal trial judge to avoid preclusion by first giving to the
jury a factual issue common to the merits of both law and equity claims for
reliefjoined in the same case. The impact of these two narrow limits might
seem mundane, but much turns on their scope. The sequence of
jurisdictional defenses can result in dismissing a claim when the court
lacked authority to hear the case and may lock a litigant out of both federal
and state courts. And, while ajury's decision on damages would restrain a
judge's decision on final injunctive relief, the judge remains free to decide
jurisdictional defenses, class certification, or evidentiary issues without
worry of affecting the jury's later consideration of common issues.
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INTRODUCTION
"The evidence and arguments a district court considers in the class
certification decision call for rigorous analysis," warned the appellate court
in the celebrated class action called In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust
Litigation.' For certification, the court explained, the class representative
must show by a preponderance of the evidence that the case satisfies the
requirements for class treatment.2 "An overlap between a class certification
requirement and the merits of a claim is no reason to decline to resolve
relevant disputes when necessary to determine whether a class certification
requirement is met."
1. 552 F.3d 305, 318 (3d Cir. 2008) (involving antitrust conspiracy action brought by
purchasers of hydrogen peroxide and related chemical products against chemical manufacturers);
see Linda S. Mullenix, Complex Litigation: Class Certification, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 26, 2009, at 9, 9
(describing Hydrogen Peroxide as potentially "the most influential decision relating to class
certification" of the decade).
2. In re Hydrogen Peroxide, 552 F.3d at 307.
3. Id. at 316. The quoted views conform to today's usual approach to preclusion. See infra
notes 191-92 and accompanying text. It is the ever more important approach as more courts are
getting into the merits to screen out class actions at the certification stage. But whether to get into
the merits at the certification phase remains controversial. See Archdiocese of Milwaukee
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In other words, after electing to pose a difficult threshold question, the
legal system advises the trial court just to plow ahead by deciding that
difficult question, even though the judge will encounter during a trial on
the merits the same issue under the same formulation and the same
standard of proof To alleviate any discomfort generated by such a view,
the Third Circuit resorted to unsupported pronouncement, perhaps without
the requisite "rigorous analysis," in mustering this dictum: "Although the
district court's findings for the purpose of class certification are conclusive
on that topic, they do not bind the fact-finder on the merits.'A Where did
the court get that idea? When is a judge really free to decide the order of
decision without worry of untoward preclusion or jury displacement?
I. DECISIONAL SEQUENCING
In deciding a case, a court must confront a series of issues that may be
sequenced in numerous ways. Deciding the order of decision is among the
law's most basic decisions. Who decides the order of decision? Although
parties generally control the issuesput before a judge, the judge generally
decides the sequence of decisions.
Of course, I am talking here of formal legal reasoning, not intuitive
decisionmaking. One common situation, useful for exploring the
sequencing decision, is where a court faces alternative grounds for
disposition, that is, an array of open routes to disposing of the claim, one
way or the other. The best example is where a defendant has raised a
number of defenses so that the court might decide in favor of the defendant
because of lack of jurisdiction, improper venue, the plaintiffs failure to
state a claim, or the defendant's affirmative defense. As a result of the
chosen sequence, the court reaches some issues and fails to reach other
issues. Among much else, the amount of effort by the court, the kind of law
made, and the parties' discovery needs all turn on the sequence of decision.
The law could impose a sequencing rule that dictates the order in which the
Supporting Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 597 F.3d 330, 337-38 (5th Cir. 2010), cert. granted sub
nom. Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 131 S. Ct. 856 (2011); Steig D. Olson, "Chipping
Away ": The Misguided Trend Toward Resolving Merits Disputes as Part ofthe Class Certification
Calculus, 43 U.S.F. L. REv. 935, 935-36 (2009); see also Richard A. Nagareda, Common Answers
for Class Certification, 63 VAND. L. REv. EN BANC 149, 149-50 (2010), http://www.vanderbiltlaw
review.org/content/articles/201 0/ll /Nagareda-Common-Answers-for-Class-Certification-63-Vand.-
L.-Rev.-En-Banc-149-2010.pdf (discussing the Wal-Mart class action).
4. In re Hydrogen Peroxide, 552 F.3d at 318. The "rigorous analysis" requirement comes
from General Telephone Co. ofthe Southwest v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 161 (1982) (interpreting the
requirements of FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)).
5. See Peter B. Rutledge, Decisional Sequencing 20 (Univ. of Ga. Sch. of Law, Working
Paper No. 10-004, 2010), available at http://ssm.com/abstract-1572709 (providing a general
treatment of sequencing and the interests at stake, in an article considering only the alternative-
grounds-of-dismissal scenario but widening the focus to include sequencing between trial and
appellate courts and between courts in different jurisdictions).
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court must decide the defenses, or the law could leave it to the judge's
discretion.
This example of alternative grounds of dismissal gives a useful sense of
what a sequencing rule is: a binding direction that the court face this issue
before that issue. However, my interest is more general than that example.
The order in which the court confronts nondispositive issues also matters.
The sequence of these issues affects the course of a case's progress. Parties
should care because an early victory on a certain issue, or even the
threatened intrusiveness of early attention to a certain issue, can shift
parties' settlement leverage dramatically. Moreover, parties' stakes will
increase to the extent that deciding an issue now might foreclose the same
issue arising later in the case. That latter concern prompted the dictum in
the Hydrogen Peroxide case, in which the appellate court assured readers
that the judge's class certification decision would not bind a jury on
common issues intertwined in the merits. Therefore, because the decisional
sequence can always have effects, the law in any setting could conceivably
dictate a sequencing rule.
A. Discretion
A judge in fact has a lot of freedom to sequence issues. In the wide
realm of freedom that judges enjoy in deciding the order of decision, what
factors guide them? As suggested by the pioneering work of Professor
Peter Rutledge, three general categories of factors predominate.
First, judicial economy plays a major role. A court's freedom to pick
and choose which issue to address first will affect the total amount of effort
required. Most notably, among alternative grounds for disposition,
proceeding immediately to the easiest and surest ground that ends a case
tends to lessen the judicial workload. A court could thereby avoid shaky
decisions on difficult issues. Ease of disposition reflects a variety of
considerations that go beyond a limited need for research and deliberation,
including the ease of evaluating objective matters rather than subjective
matters. Sureness of disposition pays the various premiums of clarity of
outcome in the trial court and minimization of costs on appeal.
In the sequencing of nondispositive issues, choosing a certain path also
might decrease judicial effort. Awareness that most cases end in settlement
might counsel a particular sequence of least effort. Even legal logic (such
as liability should come before remedy, or elements of the claim come
before affirmative defenses) or pure logic (deductive logic prompts a
certain order, or reflective equilibrium imposes an iterative readjustment of
conclusions) might suggest a path of decision that reduces mental effort.
Additionally, there is often a practicality in following a certain order
(preliminary relief comes before final relief, or factual issues need to be
tried toward the end), but these are not strictly binding rules of sequencing.
Also, more toward the substantive side of things, the law might provide an
6. See id. at 19-27.
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"if-then" relationship that appears to dictate a sequence. That is, the law
might say that some issue needs to be decided affirmatively before a
desirable procedure or remedy can be followed or pursued (although such
prerequisites are not as common as one would suppose). The best example
is the rule that the plaintiff must show an inadequate remedy at law in
order to make an equitable remedy available.7 But really these
propositions, too, are matters of practicality rather than mandated
sequencing. The proof lies in thinking of these propositions in the
alternative-grounds-of-dismissal scenario: the court can then sequence as it
wishes, so that the court could first decide that no equitable remedy exists
and hence avoid deciding inadequacy of the legal remedy. Even when
applying these propositions to nondispositive issues, the court could
actually decide in any order it wishes, even though it is usually more
economic to decide the "if" before the "then."
Second, other institutional factors may suggest a certain sequence. A
trial judge may very well choose to foster institutional interests by adopting
a certain sequence; for example, the judge might take into account that the
sequence will affect the output of precedent and thus the development of
the law. There are also prudential doctrines, like the passive virtue of
avoiding constitutional issues8 or considerations of judicial restraint and
federalism that counsel avoiding certain issues when possible. These
factors, too, are not strictly binding rules of sequencing (even if
hierarchically announced), but instead, they act as a way of informing trial
courts' discretion by identifying particularly weighty factors. Moreover
there are certain issues marked as threshold issues, like class certification,
that require early attention as a gatekeeping mechanism. But these are more
timing guidelines than sequencing rules.
Third, the sequence can affect the substantive goals of law. Sequencing
will impact parties' interests in outcome. It may affect parties' litigation
behavior, such as in choosing which issues to raise in the hope of
constraining a judge's sequencing. Even more clearly, it may affect parties'
7. See HENRY L. MCCLINTOCK, HANDBOOK OF THE PRINCIPLES OF EQUrY §§ 22,43 (2d ed.
1948).
8. See Thomas Healy, The Rise of Unnecessary Constitutional Rulings, 83 N.C. L. REv. 847
(2005) (lamenting the many exceptions to that presumption); see also Alexandra D. Lahav, The Law
and Large Numbers: Preserving Adjudication in Complex Litigation, 59 FLA. L. REv. 383, 425
(2007). Compare Alexander M. Bickel, The Supreme Court, 1960 Term-Foreword: The Passive
Virtues, 75 HARv. L. REv. 40 (1961) (discussing the Supreme Court's avoidance of constitutional
adjudication on the merits), with Gerald Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the "Passive Virtues "-A
Comment on Principle and Expediency in Judicial Review, 64 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 1 (1964)
(criticizing Bickel's thesis as "vulnerable and dangerous").
9. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(1)(A) ("At an early practicable time after a person sues or is
sued as a class representative, the court must determine by order whether to certify the action as a
class action."); 7AA CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1785.3, at 453 (3d ed. 2005) ("The time at which the court finds it
appropriate to make its class-action determination may vary with the circumstances of the particular
case.").
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settlement leverage; for example, a defendant may be disadvantaged when
a court skips over some jurisdictional issues to allow a plaintiff to pursue
discovery and a decision on the merits.' 0 A trial judge may take the
appropriate aims of law into account in setting a sequence, although
presumably maintenance of neutrality between the parties should be the
judge's strongest motive here.
Even with so much at stake in the sequencing decision, lawmakers
usually choose not to impose mandatory sequencing rules on judges. This
Article will try to delineate the wide extent ofjudges' freedom to sequence.
B. Rules
The suggestive discussion above of the factors relevant to sequencing
shows the picture to be so complicatingly multifactored that,
presumptively, lawmakers should stay out and leave it to judicial
discretion. However, given the reasonable assumption that judges tend to
act in their self-interest, judges may too heavily weigh the first factor of
minimizing workload." Thus, lawmakers may need to resort to regulation
to protect the other public and private interests at stake, at least when
neglect of those interests would come at an especially high cost. But still,
intervention should be the exception.
Conforming to that conservative view on the normative question, the
descriptive fact is that on the civil side, there are remarkably few external
limitations on a trial judge's freedom to sequence. The legislative branch
has been wholly inactive. Perhaps interest groups have formulated
insufficient concern over the subtleties of sequencing and so have exerted
no pressure. The judiciary has intervened seldom. Perhaps institutional
worries are usually too small to generate higher courts' concern over trial
judges' sequencing performance.
In current law, only two sequencing rules are of significance, given the
above-described narrow definition of what constitutes such a rule. Both
rules derive from judicial interpretations of the Constitution, and they are
10. See Rutledge, supra note 5, at 27. Rutledge explains:
Flexible sequencing rules strengthen a defendant's position in settlement because
the defendant has more avenues available to it for immediate dismissal with a
lower risk of an adverse ruling. By contrast, rigid sequencing rules strengthen a
plaintiffs position in settlement because the mandatory sequence enables the
plaintiff to obtain a favorable ruling on an early issue and, depending on the
availability ofjurisdictional discovery, drive up the defendant's costs early in the
dispute.
Id.
11. See Jonathan R. Macey, Judicial Preferences, Public Choice, and the Rules ofProcedure,
23 J. LEGAL STuD. 627, 627 (1994) (arguing that judicial response to various legal rules is often the
result ofjudges' self-interest); Richard A. Posner, What Do Judges and Justices Maximize? (The
Same Thing Everybody Else Does), 3 SUP. CT. EcON. REV. 1, 39 (1993) (stating as plausible that
"judicial effort has a diminishing effect on the satisfactions from judicial voting").
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heavily dependent on concerns linked to federal courts. Interestingly, both
rules embroil the commentator so quickly and thoroughly in matters of res
judicata that these sequencing rules will remain ever mysterious without
careful attention to preclusion. The first of the rules arises from the
scenario of alternative grounds for disposition that the defendant chose to
put before the court, while the second involves the more general scenario
of multiple issues.
Part II of the Article addresses the first rule, which treats which
jurisdictional defenses a court must decide first. Although a seemingly
mundane matter, this sequence can result in dismissing a claim when the
court lacked authority to hear the case and maybe in locking a litigant out
of both federal and state courts. The Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better
Environment 2 and Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co.13 line of cases tried to
introduce control by requiring that a federal court decide a challenge to its
jurisdiction over the case before dismissing on the merits. But as this
Article will explain, this rule boils down to a fairly modest constraint
because it has a big limitation: the court still may pick among juri sdictional
and other threshold defenses, with a dismissal on any one of them enjoying
some preclusive effect.
Part Ell of the Article addresses the other sequencing rule, derived from
the Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover1 4 and Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood 15
cases. It dictates that when a common factual issue will come before both
judge and jury within the same federal case, the jury must decide it first to
avoid the preclusive effect of a judicial decision subverting the
constitutional jury right. But as this Article will also explain, this rule is
very narrow too: it applies only to trial of factual issues common to the
merits of both law and equity claims for relief joined in the same case.
Thus, while ajury's decision on damages would restrain ajudge's decision
on final injunctive relief, the judge remains free to decide jurisdictional
defenses, class certification, or evidentiary issues without fear of affecting
the jury's later consideration of common issues.
C. Fog
Although lawmakers impose little constraint on judges' freedom to
sequence, the prevailing lack of clarity about the existence and scope of the
sequencing rules works to constrain judges more broadly. A court might be
unsure of when it can skip over jurisdiction, or concerned that an early
decision will preclude its subsequent decision of overlapping matters.
Consider, for example, this district court's concerned musings about
deciding a typical issue of personal jurisdiction that involved issues in
12. 523 U.S. 83, 94 (1998).
13. 526 U.S. 574, 577 (1999).
14. 359 U.S. 500, 510-11 (1959) (citing Scott v. Neely, 140 U.S. 106, 109-10 (1891)).
15. 369 U.S. 469, 472-73 (1962) (citing Beacon Theatres, 359 U.S. at 510-11).
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common with the merits:
If the [threshold-decision] course were undertaken, the court
might be deciding key fact issues that, if the doctrine of
estoppel were not applied, would be resubmitted for jury
determination at trial, thus making wasteful use of scarce
judicial resources and also creating a possibility of
inconsistent findings by the court on motion and the jury at
trial. If estoppel were applied on the basis of the court's
resolution of the issues, thereby precluding waste and
inconsistency, then either the court must impanel ajury just to
try those issues for disposition of the motion-a dubious
procedure at best-or else the parties would effectively be
denied jury trial on those issues because the court's findings
on them when determining the motion would preclude their
resubmission at jury trial.
This reasoning is seriously flawed, as this Article will demonstrate. To
the extent that such confusion creates a broader constraint than lawmakers
intended, the constraint is undesirable. Hence, bringing clarity to the rules
of sequencing should be beneficial and so is another aim of this Article.
II. JURISDICTIONAL PRIMACY
Our law's foremost sequencing rule says that a federal court's decision
on a challenge to its jurisdiction must come before decision on the merits.17
To understand that rule, which, as already mentioned, stems from the Steel
Co.18 and Ruhrgas9 cases, one must first draw the subtle distinction
between "nonbypassability" and "resequencing." 20
Nonbypassability, or the recuirement to decide first things first, rests
mainly on the Steel Co. case.2 A court cannot skip over a challenge to
subject-matter jurisdiction in order to dismiss on the merits, even though
finding a lack of subject-matterjurisdiction would likewise have produced
16. N. Am. Video Corp. v. Leon, 480 F. Supp. 213, 216 (D. Mass. 1979); see also Kevin M.
Clermont, Jurisdictional Fact, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 973, 978-80, 988 (2006) (calming this
particular worry by establishing that the standard of proof for jurisdiction is less demanding than the
standard applicable to the merits).
17. See generally RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., JOHN F. MANNING, DANIEL J. MELTZER & DAVID L.
SHAPIRO, HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1411-17 (6th ed.
2009). On application of this doctrine to appellate courts, see Joan Steinman, After Steel Co.:
"Hypothetical Jurisdiction" in the Federal Appellate Courts, 58 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 855, 857
(2001).
18. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 101 (1998).
19. Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 583-85 (1999) (citing Steel Co., 523
U.S. at 101-02).
20. See Scott C. Idleman, The Emergence of Jurisdictional Resequencing in the Federal
Courts, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 92-94 (2001) (providing the best treatment of this doctrine).
23. Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 101; see also Idleman, supra note 20, at 92.
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a victory for the defendant. So, when a defense is "nonbypassable," this
Article means that a court cannot skip over it and instead dismiss on the
merits. The sequencing rule is subject-matter jurisdiction first.
Resequencing, which received its blessing in Ruhrgas, mitigates this
sequencing rule. It allows courts to avoid decision on subject-matter
jurisdiction by hypothesizing its existence in order to dismiss on other
threshold grounds with a binding effect, which could preclude that
threshold issue. 22 A court can skip over challenged subject-matter
jurisdiction to dismiss for, say, lack of personal jurisdiction. So, when
this Article refers to a defense as "resequenceable," it means that a court
can choose to dismiss on that defense without first facing a nonbypassable
defense such as subject-matter jurisdiction.
A. Nonbypassability, or Deciding First Things First
Nonbypassability has obvious sequencing implications for judicial
decisionmaking. A court must decide in a certain order if a
nonbypassability rule is in place. To the extent that a court is uncertain
about the reach of the rule, but wishes to avoid reversal, it will follow the
rule even when the rule does not apply. Thus, some attention to the rule's
precise meaning is in order.
1. Rule
Drawing on a long line of precedent,24 the Steel Co. Court held that a
lower federal court could not dismiss for failure to state a claim without
first deciding a challenge to Article I standing,25 which the Supreme
Court determined was lacking in the case but which posed a harder
question to resolve.26 Even though the result was the same-judgment for
the defendant-a federal court could not give a judgment on the merits
without first ascertaining that it had jurisdiction.
The Court rested its decision on separation of powers and the Article m
requirement of a "[c]ase" or "[c]ontrovers[y]." 27 In order for a court to stay
within its proper limits, it cannot go about rendering a decision on the
merits without making sure that the case falls within the court's
22. See Idleman, supra note 20, at 94.
23. See Ruhrgas, 526 U.S. at 583, 588.
24. Steel Co., 523 U.S. 83, 93-100 (1998) (citing historical cases, including Capron v. Van
Noorden, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 126 (1804) (allowing the plaintiff to raise original subject-matter
jurisdiction on appeal)).
25. See generally 13A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3531, at 9-16 (3d ed. 2008) (discussing requirements for
Article III standing and a court's powers when requirements are not met).
26. Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 93-102, 109-10.
27. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 102.
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jurisdictional bounds.28 Based on the Court's reasoning and wording, by
"jurisdiction," the Court meant Article 111 justiciability29 as well as
ordinary subject-matter jurisdiction. 30 The Court has never added to that
short list of nonbypassable defenses.
2. Exception
Steel Co. represented the high-water mark for the nonbypassability
doctrine; however, the Court's opinion was far from definitive on whether
jurisdiction-must be decided before everything else. The majority admitted
that precedent had "diluted the absolute purity of the rule that Article HI
jurisdiction is always an antecedent question."3' The separate opinions of
six of the Justices went further in underlining that qualification. 32
The Court has since cut back on Steel Co.'s seeming thrust, first by
drawing a line between nonmerits and merits, then by ruling that a federal
court can dismiss on nonmerits grounds without reaching Article EI
justiciability or subject-matter jurisdiction.33 In the fountainhead case of
Ruhrgas, a unanimous opinion written by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg one
year after Steel Co., the Court held that a court may resequence nonmerits
defenses so that the court can face a personal jurisdiction defense before
deciding a subject-matter jurisdiction defense.
28. Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 101.
29. See generally 13 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 25, § 3529 (discussing the concept of
justiciability and the limits on judicial power created by Article III).
30. See Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 101-02 (referring to the "statutory and (especially)
constitutional elements of jurisdiction," the Court ruled, "For a court to pronounce upon the
[merits] when it has no jurisdiction to do so is, by very definition, for a court to act ultra vires.").
31. Id. at 101; see infra note 118 (collecting cases).
32. For a summary of the concurring opinion of Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the opinion of
Justice Stephen Breyer concurring in part and in the judgment, and the opinions of Justices John
Paul Stevens and Ruth Bader Ginsburg concurring in the judgment, see Jack H. Friedenthal, The
Crack in the Steel Case, 68 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 258, 265-66 (2000).
Justices [William] Rehnquist and [Clarence] Thomas join the more traditional
view espoused by Justice [Antonin] Scalia and denounce "hypothetical
jurisdiction" but do not completely shut the door .... Justice Breyer clearly
approves of "hypothetical jurisdiction" in some circumstances and both Justices
O'Connor and [Anthony] Kennedy leave open the question of if and when
"hypothetical jurisdiction" should be permitted, but indicate that the doctrine has
some validity. Justice Stevens, with whom Justice [David] Souter concurred, at the
very least leaves open the question of "hypothetical jurisdiction" or approves of
it, depending upon which portion of the opinion one relies upon. Only Justice
Ginsburg refused to be drawn into the discussion, and it was she who wrote the
unanimous opinion in Ruhrgas.
Id.
33. See infra note 120 (collecting cases).
34. Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 583-88 (1999) (treating personal
jurisdiction as resequenceable).
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As discussed below,3 5 one might argue that the list of nonmerits
defenses eligible for resequencing remains especially unclear.
Nevertheless, it is absolutely clear that this list ofresequenceable threshold
matters is not the same as, and is in fact much longer than, the list of
fundamental matters that a federal court cannot bypass in favor of the
merits. The Steel Co. case used the example of statutory standing3 as a
resequenceable defense that could precede subject-matter jurisdiction, as
well as a defense that the court could bypass in order to dismiss on the
merits. But that is just one example. A court can also bypass Prudential
standing38 and a host of other resequenceable threshold issues. 9
3. Nonbypassable Grounds
So, more precisely, which defenses can a court not bypass in order to
get to the merits? To appear on the list of nonbypassable defenses, a
ground must involve a pretty basic matter in the nature of subject-matter
jurisdiction. As the District of Columbia Circuit put it, "'a less than pure
jurisdictional question, need not be decided before a merits question."'A0
Again, most entries on the longer list of resequenceable threshold
matters are bypassable. The prime, and largely determinative, question in
relating the two lists is whether a court can bypass the resequenceable
defense of personal jurisdiction.4' So, can a court pass over personal
jurisdiction in order to dismiss on the merits?
Althouph the cases decided before Steel Co. were split on this
question, courts have since leaned more toward no.43 Most significantly,
35. See infra text accompanying notes 116-47.
36. See generally 13B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 25, § 3531.13 (discussing examples of
congressional enactments on standing).
37. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 97 n.2 (1998) (detailing expressly
that a court can bypass a statutory standing question and go to the merits, but a court may
resequence that statutory standing question before an Article III justiciability or subject-matter
jurisdiction defense).
38. See generally 13A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 25, § 3531, at 9-16 ("[S]tanding may be
denied if as a matter of judicial self-restraint it seems wise not to entertain the case.").
39. See, e.g., Idleman, supra note 20, at 93, 95-97. Compare In re Sealed Case No. 99-3091,
192 F.3d 995, 1000-01 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (per curiam) (holding a court can bypass federal sovereign
immunity for the merits), with Galvan v. Fed. Prison Indus., Inc., 199 F.3d 461, 463 (D.C. Cir.
1999) (holding a court can resequence federal sovereign immunity).
40. In re Sealed Case, 192 F.3d at 1000 (quoting United States ex rel. Long v. SCS Bus. &
Technical Inst., Inc., 173 F.3d 890, 894 (D.C. Cir. 1999)).
41. See Idleman, supra note 20, at 95 ("The natural starting point for this task is with personal
jurisdiction....").
42. Id. at 95 & nn.524-25.
43. Compare Guidry v. U.S. Tobacco Co., 188 F.3d 619, 623 n.2 (5th Cir. 1999) ("A court
must find jurisdiction, both subject matter and personal, before determining the validity of a
claim."), and United States v. Swiss Am. Bank, Ltd., 191 F.3d 30, 46 (1st Cir. 1999) ("The
Supreme Court's recent exhortations to decide issues of jurisdiction-both personal and subject
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the Supreme Court, in another unanimous opinion written by Justice
Ginsburg, seems to have assumed no in its most recent decision in this line
of cases, Sinochem International Co. v. Malaysia International Shipping
Corp.4
In that case, the district court held that it possessed admiralty subject-
matter jurisdiction, but it declined to decide personal jurisdiction and
instead dismissed on forum non conveniens grounds; the court of appeals
agreed on subject-matter jurisdiction, but it held that a court could not skip
over personal jurisdiction.45 The Supreme Court reversed, allowing
dismissal on forum non conveniens grounds without decision on personaljurisdiction.46 But the course of decision had removed from the Court's
holding anything regarding bypassability of personal jurisdiction: its
holding is perfectly consistent with a view that either forum non
conveniens or the merits can precede personal jurisdiction. Also, because
the lower courts had decided that subject-matter jurisdiction existed, the
Court clarified little about resequenceability: its stated view that forum non
conveniens is resequenceable before subject-matter jurisdiction is dictum.47
Indeed, the Court taught little besides the fact that this doctrine has become
too complicated for the Court itself It most pointedly proved this by
declaring that Steel Co., which, in fact, did not involve or discuss personaljurisdiction, "clarified that a federal court generally may not rule on the
merits of a case without first determining that it has jurisdiction over the
category of claim in suit (subject-matter jurisdiction) and the parties
(personal jurisdiction)."48 That erroneous dictum, implying that subject-
matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction are equivalents for the purpose
of the nonbypassability doctrine, will surely influence lower courts in the
future.49
matter-before reaching the merits of a case suggest to us that consideration of [the defendant's]
summary judgment motion should await a determination of the district court's jurisdiction over [the
defendant]."), with Pace v. Bureau of Prisons, No. 98-5025, 1998 WL 545414, at *1 (D.C. Cir. July
17, 1998) (per curiam) ("The district court was not required to resolve the issue of personal
jurisdiction prior to ruling on the motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. . . ."), and United
States v. Vazquez, 145 F.3d 74, 80 & n.3 (2d Cir. 1998) (bypassing service of process for the
merits).
44. 549 U.S. 422, 425 (2007); see Nathan Viavant, Recent Development, Sinochem
International Co. v. Malaysia International Shipping Corp.: The United States Supreme Court Puts
Forum Non Conveniens First, 16 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 557, 571-73 (2008) (viewing
sequencing for forum non conveniens to be now so unclear as to sow the seeds for the demise of the
nonbypassability rule).
45. Sinochem, 549 U.S. at 427-28.
46. Id. at 425.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 430-31.
49. See, e.g., Dan v. Douglas Cnty. Dep't of Corrs., No. 8:06CV714,2009 WL 483837, at *3
(D. Neb. Feb. 25, 2009) (quoting Sinochem that lack of personal jurisdiction prevents the court
from ruling on the merits); Ashton v. Florala Mem'l Hosp., No. 2:06cv226-ID, 2007 WL 1526837,
at *1 & n. I (M.D. Ala. May 24, 2007) (relying on Sinochem that the court must first decide the
issue of personal jurisdiction). But see Di Loreto v. Costigan, 351 F. App'x 747, 751 (3d Cir. 2009)
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Nevertheless, I think a court can pass over personal jurisdiction in order
to dismiss on the merits-in other words, personal jurisdiction is a
resequenceable but bypassable defense. So, a court may consider personal
jurisdiction without deciding subject-matter jurisdiction; alternatively, if it
finds subject-matter jurisdiction, the court may bypass personal jurisdiction
and dismiss on the merits. One reason is that Steel Co.'s concerns of
separation of powers and the requirement of a case or controversy do not
extend to personal jurisdiction. Likewise, any concern of intruding on
states' authority does not extend beyond subject-matter jurisdiction. The
District of Columbia Circuit again provided a good explanation: "The
district court was not required to resolve the issue of personal jurisdiction
prior to ruling on the motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim because
personal jurisdiction exists to protect the liberty interests of defendants,
unlike subject-matter jurisdiction, which serves as a limitation on judicial
competence."so
Moreover, the plaintiff cannot complain if the court accepts the
assertion that personal jurisdiction exists. Meanwhile, the defendant has
put multiple defenses before the court and so has consented somewhat to
some sort of sequencing. In any event, a successful defendant has no real
grounds for complaining about the initial court bypassing personal
jurisdiction. A victory on the merits, with its broad res judicata effects, is
worth more to the defendant than a jurisdictional dismissal.
Yet, the truly key difference between Article n1 justiciability and
subject-matter jurisdiction, on the one hand, and personal jurisdiction, on
the other hand, is that a judgment that skips over the former might be a
valid judgment under the doctrine ofjurisdiction-to-determine-jurisdiction
as elaborated in Chicot County Drainage District v. Baxter State Bank.5
That doctrine says that a judgment resting on assumed subject-matter
jurisdiction can nonetheless stand safe from challenge. Notwithstanding all
the slogans about subject-matter jurisdiction's fundamental importance, the
offense to the systemic interests at stake is not great enough always to
warrant relief from judgment-unlike the more individual interests
wrapped up in the often constitutionally based intricacies of personal
jurisdiction. A defendant who has not waived an undecided personal
jurisdiction defense should be able to raise it to obtain relief from
(bypassing personal jurisdiction for the merits).
50. Pace v. Bureau of Prisons, No. 98-5025, 1998 WL 545414, at *1 (D.C. Cir. July 17,
1998) (per curiam) (distinguishing Steel Co.).
51. 308 U.S. 371, 376-78 (1940) (precluding a defaulted defendant from collateral attack on
subject-matter jurisdiction grounds after other defendants had appeared and litigated the case
without raising subject-matter jurisdiction and after the prior court had canceled the defendants'
bonds); see infra text accompanying notes 65-75. A related assumed-jurisdiction mechanism, the
one that forecloses attack on challenged but skipped subject-matter jurisdiction, entails the
extension of hypothetical jurisdiction. See infra text accompanying notes 98-115.
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judgment.52 After a court bypasses personal jurisdiction and dismisses the
case on other grounds, the defendant could get relief from the judgment if
the defendant, who would be the only party entitled to raise the point, were
ever to need such relief.
Therein lies the key to understanding nonbypassability. The list of
nonbypassable grounds should not turn solely on the relative importance of
defenses, which would open fruitless debate on the stature of subject-
matter jurisdiction versus that of personal jurisdiction.5 3 The actual concern
instead derives from the asymmetry between subject-matter jurisdiction
and personal jurisdiction under the preclusion doctrine. Because unlitigated
subject-matter jurisdiction can preclude, 54 the fear arises that a court will
bypass this prerequisite for adjudicating and give a dismissal on the merits
that is later unassailable. To avoid that result, the Court declares the
preclusive prerequisite to be nonbypassable.5
It thus appears that when the law says a defense is "nonbypassable," it
means that if a court nevertheless purposefully skips the defense in order to
give dismissal on the merits, no brand of assumed jurisdiction will protect
the judgment from attack. When the law says that a court "cannot" bypass
subject-matter jurisdiction, it means that if the court violates the rule, a
person can get relief from the judgment upon showing a lack of subject-
matter jurisdiction, whether or not that person appealed the judgment.
Although no relief from the judgment will lie simply for violation of the
nonbypassability rule, because that would be mere error and not a voidjudgment, the judgment will fall if subject-matter jurisdiction was actually
absent.56
Therefore, the list of nonbypassable grounds should include only those
requirements for a validjudgment that, ifskipped over by the court, could
otherwise be cut off as a ground for attack against the judgment.
Accordingly, that list of nonbypassable prerequisites should include
subject-matter jurisdiction but not territorial jurisdiction or notice.
However, the authorities are lax in defining the precise scope of"subject-
matter jurisdiction" as a requirement for validity.5 First, a lack of
52. See KEVIN M. CLERMONT, PRINCIPLES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE § 4.4(C) (2d ed. 2009)
(explaining that waiver equates to jurisdiction by consent but that a defaulting and therefore
nonwaiving defendant can later challenge territorial jurisdiction or notice).
53. See Idleman, supra note 20, at 31-39.
54. Chicot, 308 U.S. at 377-78.
55. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 101-02 (1998).
56. See CLERMONT, supra note 52, § 5.1(B)(1) (explaining the concept of validity).
57. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § I & cmt. a (1982) (defining subject-
matter jurisdiction as the court's "authority to adjudicate the type of controversy involved in the
action" and acknowledging that the authority may derive from constitutional or statutory
provisions); Note, Filling the Void: Judicial Power and Jurisdictional Attacks on Judgments, 87
YALE L.J. 164, 164 & n.l (1977).
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jurisdiction under Article Ell will result in relief from judgment," but the
lesser aspects of justiciability will not.59 Second, courts need to keep
jurisdiction and the merits separate for the purpose of validity, so that the
attacker of the judgment cannot litigate the merits anew.60
In sum, no significant reason exists to require a court to decide the
existence of personal jurisdiction before deciding the merits in the
defendant's favor. With personal jurisdiction taken off the
nonbypassability list, and given an understanding of why the Court created
that list, it becomes clearer that the Steel Co. line of cases places only
Article 111 justiciability and subject-matter jurisdiction on the list of
nonbypassable grounds.
58. See, e.g., Schreiber Foods, Inc. v. Beatrice Cheese, Inc., 305 F. Supp. 2d 939, 954-55
(E.D. Wis. 2004) ("Because there was no case or controversy, this court lacked constitutional power
to enter judgment against defendants."), rev'don other grounds, 402 F.3d 1198 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
59. See, e.g., Mendell ex rel. Viacom, Inc. v. Gollust, 909 F.2d 724, 731-32 (2d Cir. 1990)
("Plaintiffs acquisition of a note following an adverse ruling on his claim to standing as a
shareholder did not present the kind of 'extraordinary' circumstance that mandates relief to avoid an
'extreme and undue hardship."' (quoting Matarese v. LeFevre, 801 F.2d 98, 106 (2d Cir. 1986))),
aff'don other grounds, 501 U.S. 115 (1991); Sarin v. Ochsner, 721 N.E.2d 932,935 (Mass. App.
Ct. 2000) ("More important, even if the plaintiff had no such direct interest, the defendants may not
raise the issue of standing in a rule 60(b) motion. Whether the facts of a given case meet the
standard for exercising jurisdiction-here whether the plaintiff has standing-has been termed a
'quasi-jurisdictional' determination." (quoting Lubben v. Selective Serv. Sys., 453 F.2d 645, 649
(1st Cir. 1972))).
60. The Restatement acknowledges that the definition ofjurisdiction is "particularly difficult
when the issue determining subject matter jurisdiction parallels an issue going to the merits" but the
modem tendency "is to reduce the vulnerability of final judgments to attack on the ground that the
tribunal lacked subject matter jurisdiction." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 11 cmt. e
(1982). It concludes:
In all such situations, the matter in question can plausibly be characterized
either as going to subject matter jurisdiction or as being one of merits or
procedure. The line between the categories is not established through refinement
of terminology but through the cumulation of categorizing decisions into a pattern.
The establishment of pattern is complicated by the fact that the distinction between
subject matter jurisdiction and merits or procedure has significance in contexts
other than that concerning the vulnerability of a judgment to delayed attack....
Whatever the context, the underlying question is how far to go in the direction
of policing the boundaries of a court's subject matter jurisdiction, when the cost of
intensive policing is to enlarge the vulnerability of the proceeding to interruption
through extraordinary writ or the like and to belated attack after it has gone to
judgment.
Id.; see Morrison v. Nat'l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2877 (2010); Carr v. Tillery, 591 F.3d
909, 917, 919 (7th Cir. 2010); Clermont, supra note 16, at 1017-20; Howard M. Wasserman,
Jurisdiction, Merits, and Procedure: Thoughts on a Trichotomy, 102 Nw.U. L. REv. 1547, 1547-
52 (2008).
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B. Resequencing, or Using Hypothetical Jurisdiction to Produce a
"Valid" Invalid Judgment
Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co. represents another aspect ofjurisdictional primacy that is different in operation from nonbypassability:
it allows resequencing of nonmerits defenses.61 Ruhrgas held that a lower
federal court could dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction without first
deciding subject-matterjurisdiction. 62 Subsequent cases have expanded the
resequencing exception. For example, although a court cannot bypass
subject-matter jurisdiction in favor of a disposition on the merits, it can
skip over subject-matter jurisdiction to dismiss under forum non
63conveniens. Authorized to dismiss for a nonjurisdictional threshold
defense, a court becomes freer to pursue judicial economy by deciding
along an easier and surer path, as long as the outcome is the same party
prevailing as if jurisdiction were denied.6"
To understand the effect of resequencing, one must consider some
related doctrines, beginning with the doctrine ofjurisdiction-to-determine-
jurisdiction. This doctrine relates to res judicata, and res judicata is where
resequencing irresistibly takes us. There follows a general description as a
means of orientation.
1. Jurisdiction-to-Determine-Jurisdiction
The doctrine ofjurisdiction-to-determine-jurisdiction treats "a kind of
question different from the normal application of res judicata: it does not
involve preclusive use of determinations embedded in a valid judgment,
but instead involves preclusive use of prior determinations [underlying a
judgment] in order to establish [its] validity."65 That is to say, an
affirmative ruling on subject-matter jurisdiction, territorial jurisdiction, or
adequate notice can foreclose relitigation of that prior determination and
thus preclude the parties from attacking the resultant judgment by raising
that ground in subsequent litigation. 66
It is true that if a defendant faces suit in a court that lacks jurisdiction or
fails to give notice, the defendant ordinarily does not have to respond in
any way. If the defendant takes no action of any kind in response to the
suit, the court may enter a default judgment, but the judgment will be
invalid. If the plaintiff should attempt to assert rights based on that
61. Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co, 526 U.S. 574, 588 (1999).
62. Id. at 583-88.
63. Sinochem Int'l Co. v. Malay. Int'l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 432 (2007) (dictum).
64. See Heather Elliott, Jurisdictional Resequencing and Restraint, 43 NEW ENG. L. REv.
725, 742-46 (2009) (trying to characterize the doctrine as also serving as judicial restraint).
65. CLERMONT, supra note 52, § 4.4(B)(2), at 294. See generally CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT &
MARY KAY KANE, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 16, at 95-97 (6th ed. 2002) (discussing the doctrine
ofjurisdiction-to-determine-jurisdiction).
66. CLERMONT, supra note 52, § 5.1(A)(3).
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judgment in a later suit involving the same defendant, the defendant
ordinarily can avoid the effects of the judgment by showing that its entry
was without jurisdiction or notice. The defendant has the right to a day in
some court to question the authority of the court that rendered the earlier
judgment.6 7
Instead, the defendant may choose to raise the jurisdiction or notice
issue in the initial action before the challenged court itself. Then, the court
that otherwise lacks authority could conceivably have jurisdiction to
determine whether it has jurisdiction and whether its notice was good, and
its affirmative rulings on such questions could be binding on the defendant
so as to preclude relitigation of the same questions. The defendant's
appearance in the challenged court would then be the defendant's day in
court on the question of the forum's authority.
Our law, in fact, accepts this so-called bootstrap principle,68 and so
allows a court lacking fundamental authority to issue a judgment that will
nevertheless be immune from later attack.69 Because the essential issue of
jurisdiction or notice was actually litigated and determined, even if
erroneously, the defendant cannot relitigate the same issue in subsequent
litigation. The defendant can obtain appellate review of the erroneous
ruling, of course, but cannot challenge it upon seeking relief from
judgment. Here, the desire for finality outweighs the concern for validity.70
Indeed, our law accepts the bootstrap principle's value of finality with
true enthusiasm, despite its conflict with the intuitive value of validity. Our
law applies the principle even more broadly than the foregoing illustration
of actually litigated and determined forum-authority defenses. 1 Strangely,
the most important extension comes in connection with subject-matter
jurisdiction, in spite of the traditional lore about subject-matter
jurisdiction's fundamental importance. On the one hand, as to
unchallenged subject-matterjurisdiction in any action litigated to judgment
by contesting parties, the implicit determination of the existence of subject-
matterjurisdiction has the preclusive consequences of an actually litigated
determination, insofar as foreclosing attack on the judgment goes.72 On the
other hand, sometimes the interests inherent in subject-matterjurisdiction
67. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §§ 65-66 (1982).
68. See Dan B. Dobbs, Beyond Bootstrap: Foreclosing the Issue of Subject-Matter
Jurisdiction Before Final Judgment, 51 MINN. L. REv. 491, 494-99 (1967).
69. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §§ 10-12 (1982).
70. See Durfee v. Duke, 375 U.S. 106, 116 (1963) (quasi in rem jurisdiction); Johnson v.
Muelberger, 340 U.S. 581, 589 (1951) (jurisdiction over status); Chicot Cnty. Drainage Dist. v.
Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371, 375 (1940) (subject-matterjurisdiction); Baldwin v. Iowa State
Traveling Men's Ass'n, 283 U.S. 522, 524-25 (1931) (personal jurisdiction).
71. Indeed, upon a challenge to the existence of either territorial jurisdiction or adequate
notice, an affirmative ruling precludes the defendant from attacking the resultant judgment on either
ground in subsequent litigation. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 10 cmt. d (1982).
72. See id. § 12 cmt. d; supra text accompanying note 51 (introducing the Chicot doctrine).
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are just too important to ignore. Even an express finding of the existence of
subj ect-matter jurisdiction will not preclude the parties from attacking the
resultant judgment on that ground in special circumstances, such as where
the court plainly lacked subject-matter jurisdiction or where the jud ment
substantially infringes on the authority of another court or agency.
This doctrine of jurisdiction-to-determine-jurisdiction thus ends up
being a bit peculiar. It constitutes a third body of res judicata law
distinguishable from claim and issue preclusion, or perhaps a body of law
standing separate from res judicata. It is obviously similar to issue
preclusion, but it differs in several respects. 74 The reason for the
differences is that the policies that shape the doctrine of jurisdiction-to-
determine-jurisdiction are unique, and they produce a unique set of rules.
For related reasons tied to the notion that the doctrine defines the judgment
even more intimately than does usual res judicata, the federal common law
of jurisdiction-to-determine-jurisdiction applies to a prior federal
judgment.
2. Jurisdiction-to-Determine-No-Jurisdiction
"Passing beyond the [preclusive] effects of affirmative rulings on
forum-authority, what if the initial court decides that it lacks jurisdiction or
73. See, e.g., Kalb v. Feuerstein, 308 U.S. 433, 438-39 (1940) (holding that a state court
proceeding could not preclude a bankruptcy proceeding); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
JUDGMENTS § 12 cmts. c, e (1982); Karen Nelson Moore, Collateral Attack on Subject Matter
Jurisdiction: A Critique ofthe Restatement (Second) of Judgments, 66 CORNELLL. REv. 534,560-
61(1981).
74. See CLERMONT, supra note 52, § 5.1(A)(3). Issue preclusion differs in five respects:
First, issue preclusion requires a valid prior judgment. Jurisdiction to determine
jurisdiction does not require validity, but instead works to make invulnerable what
could otherwise be an invalid judgment. Second, issue preclusion applies only in a
subsequent action, and so does not apply on a motion for relief from judgment,
which is technically a continuation of the initial action. Jurisdiction to determine
jurisdiction, however, does apply to preclude a validity attack by such a motion, as
well as by the other methods for relief from judgment. Third, issue preclusion
usually does not work to bind the party prevailing on the issue. Jurisdiction to
determine jurisdiction will preclude the successful plaintiff if the unsuccessful
defendant would be precluded on the jurisdiction or notice issue. Fourth, issue
preclusion applies only to issues actually litigated and determined. Jurisdiction to
determine jurisdiction sometimes applies to issues of subject-matter jurisdiction
that were not litigated at all, and even against a defaulting party. Fifth, and most
importantly, special policies and concerns are at work with respect to the
jurisdiction and notice defenses, so the law needs to develop special rules and
exceptions for jurisdiction to determine jurisdiction.
Id. § 5.1(A)(3), at 307.
75. See Harper Macleod Solicitors v. Keaty & Keaty, 260 F.3d 389, 397-98 (5th Cir. 2001)
(distinguishing Semtek). On the goveming law for ordinary res judicata, see Semtek Int'l Inc. v.
Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 502 (2001); Patrick Woolley, The Sources of Federal
Preclusion Law After Semtek, 72 U. CIN. L. REV. 527, 535-44 (2003).
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failed to give notice" and so dismisses? 76 "That is, can a court, which is
admittedly without authority to enter a valid judgment, make any rulings
that have preclusive effect?"77 Yes, a doctrine ofjurisdiction-to-deternine-
no-jurisdiction exists.7 8 Courts and scholars have elaborated this doctrine
less thoroughly than the jurisdiction-to-determine-jurisdiction doctrine, and
thus its reach remains more controversial.
A court should have authority to determine its own lack of authority.
The initial court's ruling that it lacks authority should prevent a second try
that presents exactly the same issue. One argument for giving it at least this
minimal preclusive effect is that giving it no preclusive effect might raise
the constitutional problem associated with advisory opinions. 79 More to the
point, common sense supports preclusion on the threshold issue in order to
prevent a party-who chose a court that ruled against its own authority-
from litigating the same point repetitively. So, for such limited purpose, the
prior judgment is a valid one.
Naturally, there should be limits to the preclusive effects.so After all,
the court was supposed to be exercising only its jurisdiction for
determining jurisdiction.8  The dismissal of the initial action on a
jurisdictional defense does not generate a bar to a second action in an
appropriate court that presents different jurisdictional issues.82 Further, the
initial court's negative ruling on the jurisdictional issue should not have
normal issue-preclusive effects in a later action and so should not preclude
an issue on the merits of the same or any other claim.83 For such purposes,
the prior judgment is an invalid one. Many good reasons support such
limits, including the notions that limited jurisdiction should yield limited
76. CLERMONT, supra note 52, § 4.4(B)(3), at 297.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Michael J. Edney, Comment, Preclusive Abstention: Issue Preclusion and Jurisdictional
Dismissals After Ruhrgas, 68 U. CHI. L. REv. 193,212-13 (2001) (addressing the preclusive effect
of a federal court's dismissal for lack of jurisdiction).
80. Id. at 206-22.
81. See Idleman, supra note 20, at 57-63.
82. See Hughes v. United States, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 232, 237 (1866).
83. See Anusbigian v. Trugreen/Chemlawn, Inc., 72 F.3d 1253, 1257 (6th Cir. 1996) ("Thus,
contrary to the plaintiff's fear, expressed in his brief, that he might be foreclosed from seeking
damages in state court under the doctrines of res judicata or 'law of the case,' the remand order
forecloses nothing except further litigation of his claim in federal court."); United States v. Ritchie,
15 F.3d 592, 598 (6th Cir. 1994) ("[A]lthough Ritchie's clients were barred (after Judge Jarvis's
ruling) from relitigating whether their motion to quash could be heard before the IRS brought an
enforcement action, Judge Hull was not bound by any factual findings made by Judge Jarvis for the
limited purpose of considering the jurisdictional challenge .... ); By-Prod Corp. v. Armen-Berry
Co., 668 F.2d 956,962 (7th Cir. 1982) ("Armen-Berry can sue By-Prod and Schiffunder Article 14
of the Illinois Criminal Code in an Illinois court, and that court will not be bound by our reading of
the Illinois law of punitive damages."). But see infra note 109 and accompanying text.
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effects" and that the truncated procedure for deciding jurisdiction counsels
against carrying jurisdictional determinations over to affect the merits.8 5
The driving idea is that because the prior court lacked jurisdiction, it
should be able to preclude little more than is absolutely necessary.
Therefore, the basic rule is that the preclusive effect of jurisdiction-to-
determine-no-jurisdiction reaches no further than the precise issue of
jurisdiction itself.86 It will defeat jurisdiction in any attempt to sue again in
a second court where the same jurisdictional issue arises, even when one
court is state and the other federal.8 8 But a finding of no jurisdiction does
not produce a generally valid judgment and thus will not otherwise be
binding in any other action.
Going beyond these basics, a determination of no jurisdiction probably
should not provide nonmutual preclusion, preventing a nonparty from
basing preclusion on the prior determination.89 Nor should it work to
establish, rather than defeat, the jurisdiction of the other court." For
example, a finding that a federal court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction
because of the nonexistence of some fact critical to exclusive jurisdiction
should not force a state court to accept jurisdiction.91 Even though this
84. See Edney, supra note 79, at 206-14.
85. See id. at 220-22.
86. See Idleman, supra note 20, at 29-30; Edney, supra note 79, at 217-18. It is true that
Federal Practice and Procedure sounds more expansive in its explanation that "[a]lthough a
dismissal for lack of jurisdiction does not bar a second action as a matter of claim preclusion, it
does preclude relitigation of the issues determined in ruling on the jurisdiction question." 18A
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 4436, at 154 (rev. ed. 2002). But, in fact, some of the specific discussion and the
cases cited conform to the idea that preclusion extends only to "the same issue ofjurisdiction." Id.
at 150 n.3, 168. But see id. at 158 n. 16 (Supp. 2010) ("'Though a jurisdictional determination is not
usually binding on future proceedings, it is binding as to issues that are addressed by the Court in
determining the jurisdictional question."' (quoting Gavilan-Cuate v. Yetter, 276 F.3d 418,420 (8th
Cir. 2002))).
87. See, e.g., Coors Brewing Co. v. M6ndez-Torres, 562 F.3d 3, 8-9 (1st Cir. 2009),
abrogated on other grounds, Levin v. Commerce Energy, Inc., 130 S. Ct. 2323 (2010); Hill v.
Potter, 352 F.3d 1142, 1146-47 (7th Cir. 2003); Bromwell v. Mich. Mut. Ins. Co., 115 F.3d 208,
212-13 (3d Cir. 1997); Dozier v. Ford Motor Co., 702 F.2d 1189, 1191 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
88. See, e.g., ASARCO, Inc. v. Glenara, Ltd., 912 F.2d 784, 787 (5th Cir. 1990) ("[T]he
Louisiana courts would be bound by our ruling that defendants had insufficient contacts with
Louisiana to satisfy the federal due process clause requisites for personal jurisdiction."); Eaton v.
Weaver Mfg. Co., 582 F.2d 1250, 1255 (10th Cir. 1978) ("We must agree that the merits of the
issue of personal jurisdiction over Volkswagen South was decided by the unappealed state court
judgments and that they bar relitigation of the jurisdictional issue in the instant cases.").
89. 18A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 86, § 4436, at 156, 171.
90. See R.G. Barry Corp. v. Mushroom Makers, Inc., 612 F.2d 651,657 n.10 (2d Cir. 1979),
abrogated on other grounds, Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 130 S. Ct. 1181 (2010). But see Roth v.
McAllister Bros., 316 F.2d 143, 145 (2d Cir. 1963).
91. See Kircher v. Putnam Funds Trust, 547 U.S. 633, 647 (2006) (saying that "[w]hile the
state court cannot review the decision to remand in an appellate way, it is perfectly free to reject the
remanding court's reasoning," but basing the refusal to establish jurisdiction by preclusion on the
320 FLORIDA IAW REVIE W [Vol. 63
SEQUENCING THE ISSUES FOR JUDICIAL DECISIONMAKING
limitation on preclusion might lead to awkward situations,92 an extension
of binding effect to the unempowered federal court's dismissal appears
unnecessary and, hence, improper. Additional arguments for this limitation
on preclusion might be (1) that the burden of proof for defeating
jurisdiction is often lighter than the burden of proof for establishing
jurisdiction, and issue preclusion does not apply when the burden
increases,93 and (2) that establishing jurisdiction would usually work to the
detriment of the defendant, and issue preclusion normally does not bind the
victorious party.94 These additional arguments are not determinative,
however, because the rules of jurisdiction-to-determine-no-jurisdiction
might be s ecially tailored and need not conform to those of issue
preclusion.
The jurisdiction-to-determine-no-jurisdiction doctrine, however, is not
in all respects narrower than issue preclusion. The law's capability to shape
this special preclusion doctrine can broaden it. For example, by virtue of
jurisdiction-to-determine-no-jurisdiction, an unreviewable remand for lack
of removal jurisdiction might preclude a subsequent federal action on the
same cause,96 even thou h an inability to obtain appellate review usually
defeats issue preclusion.
3. Hypothetical Subject-Matter Jurisdiction
Finally arriving at the workings of Ruhrgas, we find that most of the
work is already done. The unchallenged and undecided issue of subject-
matter jurisdiction turns out to be entitled to the insulation from attack
afforded by the jurisdiction-to-determine-jurisdiction doctrine, if the court
acted as if subject-matter jurisdiction exists. A decided threshold defense
turns out to be entitled to the preclusive effect afforded by the jurisdiction-
to-determine-no-jurisdiction doctrine, if the court dismissed on that
defense.
Now, Ruhrgas's resequencing allows the court to "hypothesize" the
existence of subject-matter jurisdiction (including Article I justiciability)
in order to dismiss on a threshold defense, even though someone has
challenged subject-matter jurisdiction.98 As long as something has not gone
inability to obtain federal appellate review of the remand).
92. See Julie Fukes Stewart, Note, "Litigation Is Not Ping-Pong, " Except When It Is:
Resolving the Westfall Act's Circularity Problem, 95 CORNELL L. REv. 1021, 1033-34 (2010)
(describing cases that bounce between removal and remand).
93. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 28(4) (1982).
94. LaBuhn v. Bulkmatic Transp. Co., 865 F.2d 119, 122 (7th Cir. 1988) (dictum) ("[A]
finding which a party had no incentive (other than fear of collateral estoppel) to appeal, because he
won, has no collateral estoppel effect.").
95. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
96. See 18A WRIGHT ETAL., supra note 86, § 4436, at 155-56, 164.
97. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 28(1) (1982).
98. Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 583-88 (1999).
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haywire, such as the prior court plainly lacking subject-matter jurisdiction
or the prior judqment substantially infringing on the authority of another
court or agency, 9 this hypothetical jurisdiction will supply subject-matter
jurisdiction to produce a valid judgment for the very limited purpose of
jurisdiction-to-determine-no-jurisdiction with respect to the ground for
threshold dismissal.
Admittedly, not everything about Ruhrgas follows without a wisp of
oddity. By combining two purposefully restricted doctrines-the
jurisdiction-to-determine-jurisdiction doctrine and the jurisdiction-to-
determine-no-jurisdiction doctrine-Ruhrgas expands them. Although it
does not produce a generally valid and binding judgment, it produces a
judgment that will defeat a second court's jurisdiction if the same
jurisdictional issue arises there. That is to say, ajudgment that decided that
some facet of authority was lacking will have this preclusive effect-even
though subject-matter jurisdiction might have been lacking, too. That is
odd. Yet that oddity was precisely the intended effect of Ruhrgas's
blessing of hypothetical jurisdiction.
Moreover, the resulting doctrine is broader than the name "jurisdiction-
to-determine-no-jurisdiction" implies. It extends beyond jurisdiction to
quasi-jurisdictional decisions and other dismissals for lack of authority,
including on venue and forum non conveniens grounds. 00 For example, if
a court faces defenses of lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and of
improper venue, it can skip over the former to give a decision that the
venue was wrong, which will be binding on that narrow point thanks to
hypothetical jurisdiction.o'0 Ruhrgas thereby yields a judgment valid for
the very limited purpose of defeating jurisdiction, or authority more
generally, in any attempt to sue again in a court where the same
jurisdictional or authority issue arises. 02
99. See supra text accompanying note 73 (explaining that assumed-jurisdiction preclusion
does not extend to every exercise of subject-matter jurisdiction).
100. See 18A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 86, § 4436, at 171-79.
101. Hypothetical jurisdiction supplies only subject-matter jurisdiction. Thus, relief from the
dismissal for improper venue should lie on the ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction or adequate
notice. See supra note 52 and accompanying text (explaining that assumed-jurisdiction preclusion
does not extend to territorial jurisdiction or notice).
102. Bear in mind that a valid judgment-one that can survive an attack for relief from
judgment on fundamental grounds such as lack ofjurisdiction or notice-enjoys normal resjudicata
effects. Thus, after denial of a forum-authority defense by a demonstrably valid judgment, the
normal rules of res judicata apply. For example, if the question of a party's domicile is actually
litigated and determined to uphold jurisdiction, and if that question of domicile arises as part of the
merits of another claim, the prior finding could have issue-preclusive effect. For a quite different
example, if a defendant loses a post-judgment attack made on the ground of inadequate notice, the
loss will preclude further attacks on that ground, under the normal doctrine of issue preclusion. See,
e.g., Arecibo Radio Corp. v. Puerto Rico, 825 F.2d 589, 590 (1st Cir. 1987). Therefore, if a federal
court bypassed all threshold issues to dismiss for lack of venue, and a collateral attack on the
judgment later failed because the second court found that the first court had jurisdiction and gave
notice, the venue determination would be issue preclusive-without resort to the jurisdiction-to-
determine-jurisdiction doctrine, the jurisdiction-to-determine-no-jurisdiction doctrine, or
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One could counterargue that Ruhrgas's holding does not strictly require
the existence of hypothetical jurisdiction. The idea would be that all the
Ruhrgas Court did was allow dismissal for personal jurisdiction, thus
getting the case out of the court but not necessarily giving the personal
jurisdiction decision any binding effect. Yet no one takes that position.103
The preclusion of hypothetical jurisdiction is necessary because otherwise
the judgment will mean almost nothing. Additionally, there is the argument
that preclusion on the threshold issue is required practically to prevent the
plaintiff from suing repetitively. Finally, the system does not want to
discourage the defendant from putting an array of threshold defenses
before the court, which can then decide the optimal course of proceeding.
In fact, those wary of overbroad preclusion counterargue that preclusion
at the least should not broaden from intrasystem necessity to intersystem
bindingness, so that the plaintiff who cannot sue again in federal court
should be able to sue without preclusion in state court.' " This
counterargument would be at its strongest when the federal court dismissed
on the basis of state law and arguably was wrong as to the state law. The
rejoinder here is that the parties and the Justices during oral argument in
Ruhrgas certainly assumed that intersystem preclusion was at stake: 0 5 as
Justice Ginsburg declared, "The Federal court would be accomplishing
nothing [if it did not] bind the State court." 106 The Court itself clearly
envisaged intersystem preclusion: as Justice Ginsburg suggested in her
opinion for the unanimous Court, "If a federal court dismisses a removed
case for want of personal jurisdiction, that determination may preclude the
parties from relitigating the very same personal jurisdiction issue in state
court." 0 7
Moreover, intersystem preclusion is implicit in Ruhrgas's holding,
because allowing the Texas state court to reconsider either federal subject-
matter jurisdiction or the federal court's decision on personal jurisdiction
would undercut the Court's decision. Reconsideration of subject-matter
hypothetical jurisdiction.
103. Even the earliest paper, which coined the term "hypothetical jurisdiction," concluded that
the resulting judgment must have res judicata effect. Comment, Assuming Jurisdiction Arguendo:
The Rationale and Limits ofHypothetical Jurisdiction, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 712, 730 n. 110 (1979).
104. See Ely Todd Chayet, Comment, Hypothetical Jurisdiction and Interjurisdictional
Preclusion: A "Comity" ofErrors, 28 PEPP. L. REv. 75, 99-101 (2000) (suggesting that a federal
decision based on hypothetical jurisdiction should not preclude state courts); Edney, supra note 79,
at 215 n. 116, 218, 222 (arguing that there should be no such preclusion of personal jurisdiction in
state court, not merely that there should be no preclusion if the state court were to find on collateral
attack that federal subject-matter jurisdiction was lacking).
105. Transcript of Oral Argument at 4,8-9, 13,30-31, Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526
U.S. 574 (1999) (No. 98-470).
106. Id. at 9; see supra text accompanying note 87.
107. Ruhrgas, 526 U.S. at 585 (citing Baldwin v. Iowa State Traveling Men's Ass'n, 283 U.S.
522, 524-27 (1931), with the parenthetical to Baldwin that "personal jurisdiction ruling has issue-
preclusive effect").
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jurisdiction would forfeit the effort saved in skipping a tough question, and
the reconsideration would come in a state court distant from and unfamiliar
with the issue's intricacies. The state's reconsideration of personal
jurisdiction would directly disregard the federal court's determination.
Accordingly, under the federal res judicata law applicable to a federal
judgment, the federal judgment in Ruhrgas's favor would preclude later
suit in a Texas state court for lack of personal jurisdiction.
The counterarguments against preclusion will not prevail. In fact, the
danger is that courts will give too much preclusive effect. 09 That danger
will only grow in the light of Justice Ginsburg's dicta:
Issue preclusion in subsequent state-court litigation,
however, may also attend a federal court's subject-matter
determination. Ruhrgas hypothesizes, for example, a
defendant who removes on diversity grounds a state-court suit
seeking $50,000 in compensatory and $1 million in punitive
damages for breach of contract. If the district court determines
that state law does not allow punitive damages for breach of
contract and therefore remands the removed action for failure
to satisfy the amount in controversy, the federal court's
conclusion will travel back with the case. Assuming a fair
airing of the issue in federal court, that court's ruling on
permissible state-law damages may bind the parties in state
court, although it will set no precedent otherwise governing
state-court adjudications. See Chicot County Drainage Dist.
v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371, 376 (1940) ("[Federal
courts'] determinations of [whether they have jurisdiction to
entertain a case] may not be assailed collaterally.");
Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 12, p. 115 (1980)
("When a court has rendered ajudgment in a contested action,
the judgment [ordinarily] precludes the parties from litigating
the question of the court's subject matter jurisdiction in
subsequent litigation.").1o
Professor and attorney Charles Alan Wright offered this diversity
hypothetical during his oral argument for the petitioner; Justice Ginsburg
108. See 18A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 86, § 4436, at 168 & n.33; Idleman, supra note 20, at
29; see also David L. Shapiro, Justice Ginsburg's First Decade: Some Thoughts About Her
Contributions in the Fields ofProcedure and Jurisdiction, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 21, 30 (2004).
109. See, e.g., Matosantos Commercial Corp. v. Applebee's Int'l, Inc., 245 F.3d 1203, 1206
(10th Cir. 2001) (holding that an issue decided in a personal jurisdiction dismissal-"'whether
Applebee's assumed or represented that it would assume Casual Dining's purchase agreement with
Matosantos"'-was preclusive on the merits in a second suit (quoting Matosantos Commercial
Corp. v. Applebee's Int'l, Inc., 64 F. Supp. 2d 1105, 1109 (D. Kan. 1999), af'd, 245 F.3d 1203
(10th Cir. 2001))).
110. Ruhrgas, 526 U.S. at 585-86 (some citations omitted).
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just swallowed this example whole."' She provided completely irrelevant
support in citing to Chicot and the Restatement, as both deal only with
jurisdiction-to-determine-iurisdiction cutting off collateral attack and not
with collateral estoppel." Not surprisingly then, her result, even if hedged,
is wrong.' 13
No reason exists to give decisions based on hypothetical jurisdiction
more preclusive effect than what is appropriate under jurisdiction-to-
determine-no-jurisdiction.11 4 Again, the many good reasons for strictly
limiting res judicata effects include the idea that limited jurisdiction should
yield limited effects, especially when the court has skipped over decision
on subject-matter jurisdiction. The truncated procedure for deciding forum-
authority issues counsels against carrying such determinations over to
affect the merits. 5 Therefore, the preclusive effect in this context should
work only to defeat any attempt to relitigate in a second court where the
same authority issue arises, thus not extending beyond the precise issue of
authority that the first court decided.
4. Resequenceable Grounds
The question remains: Which grounds for dismissal can leapfrog ahead
of subject-matterjurisdiction? Resequencing, even of the merits (although
presumably without the interplay of hypothetical jurisdiction), had become
popular in the lower courts by the 1990s. That movement generated the
reaction of the Supreme Court's Steel Co. case." 7 But a certain amount of
resequencing had in fact been popular even in the Supreme Court,1 as
Steel Co. acknowledged." 9 After Steel Co., the Supreme Court even
expanded its list of resequenceable grounds.120 Meanwhile, the lower
111. Transcript of Oral Argument at 8-9, Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574
(1999) (No. 98-470).
112. See Moore, supra note 73, at 541-46.
113. See supra note 83 (collecting cases); Idleman, supra note 20, at 29-30 (arguing also that
Ginsburg's example invokes law of the case rather than resjudicata); Edney, supra note 79, at 201-
02.
114. See supra text accompanying notes 80-95.
115. See Edney, supra note 79, at 206-14, 220-22.
116. See, e.g., United States v. Eyer, 113 F.3d 470, 474 (3d Cir. 1997) (calling hypothetical
jurisdiction to reach the merits a "settled principle").
117. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 93-94 (1998).
118. See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 612 (1997) (treating class
certification as resequenceable); Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 66-67
(1997) (mootness); Ellis v. Dyson, 421 U.S. 426, 435 (1975) (abstention); Moor v. Cnty. of
Alameda, 411 U.S. 693, 716-17 (1973) (discretionary supplemental jurisdiction); Chandler v.
Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit, 398 U.S. 74, 86-88 (1970) (exhaustion).
119. See Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 100 n.3.
120. Sinochem Int'l Co. v. Malay. Int'l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 432 (2007) (dictum)
(treating forum non conveniens as resequenceable); Tenet v. Doe, 544 U.S. 1, 3 (2005) (applying
Totten doctrine, which prohibits actions against the government based on covert espionage
agreements); Kowalski v. Tesmer, 543 U.S. 125, 129 (2004) (third-party standing); Elk Grove
2011] 325
FLORIDA LAWREVIEW
courts resumed expanding that list too, to reach many relatively low-level
inquiries.' 22
"There is an array of non-merits questions" that federal courts may
resequence today, as the District of Columbia Circuit summed up nicely
once again.122 In Tenet v. Doe, the Supreme Court tried to generalize when
it allowed resequencing of a ground "designed not merely to defeat the
asserted claims, but to preclude judicial inquiry." 23
Then, in Sinochem, the Court more clearly drew the outer line as lying
between "nonmerits" and "merits" grounds by explaining: "Dismissal short
of reaching the merits means that the court will not 'proceed at all' to an
adjudication of the cause.... The principle underlying these decisions was
well stated by the Seventh Circuit: '[J]urisdiction is vital only if the court
proposes to issue a judgment on the merits."" 24 Thus, "when
considerations of convenience, fairness, and judicial economy so
warrant,"l25 a court can decide "a threshold, nonmerits issue"l26 like forum
non conveniens before subject-matter jurisdiction. But then, almost as if to
demonstrate the lack of clarity of the Court's chosen dividing line, Justice
Ginsburg qualified as to a conditional dismissal: "We therefore need not
decide whether a court conditioning aforum non conveniens dismissal on
the waiver of jurisdictional or limitations defenses in the forein forum
must first determine its own authority to adjudicate the case." 27 What
Sinochem ultimately means, then, is that there is still plenty of room for
arguing about the extent of the list of resequenceable grounds.
Matters of sovereign immunity generate hot dispute in this respect.
Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 18-19 (2004) (prudential standing); Ortiz v. Fibreboard
Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 831 (1999) (class certification, viewed as a matter of statutory standing);
Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 577-78 (1999) (personal jurisdiction).
121. See, e.g., In re LimitNone, LLC, 551 F.3d 572, 576 (7th Cir. 2008) (transfer ofvenue); In
re Papandreou, 139 F.3d 247, 255-56 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (forum non conveniens).
122. Galvan v. Fed. Prison Indus., Inc., 199 F.3d 461, 463 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (treating federal
sovereign immunity as resequenceable).
123. 544 U.S. 1, 6 n.4 (2005) (dismissing on the basis of a rule prohibiting actions against the
government based on covert espionage agreements).
124. Sinochem, 549 U.S. at 431 (quoting Intec USA, LLC v. Engle, 467 F.3d 1038, 1041 (7th
Cir. 2006)).
125. Id. at 432.
126. Id. at 433.
127. Id. at 435.
128. See Idleman, supra note 20, at 81-89 (discussing both the Eleventh Amendment and
federal sovereign immunity); cf id. at 95-97 (discussing their bypassability); Hien Ngoc Nguyen,
Comment, Under Construction: Fairness, Waiver, and Hypothetical Eleventh Amendment
Jurisdiction, 93 CAL. L. REV. 587, 590-91 (2005) (discussing Eleventh Amendment immunity). The
defense of domestic sovereign immunity is tricky because some see it in various contexts as
jurisdictional, while others see it as quasi-jurisdictional. But the key question is whether a decision
on such a ground will bar a new action, not some other question like whether the defendant can get
relief from a default judgment on such a ground. Compare Galvan v. Fed. Prison Indus., Inc., 199
F.3d 461, 463 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (treating federal sovereign immunity as resequenceable), with
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Does the act-of-state defense come within the fold of threshold, nonmerits
defenses? 29 Is qualified immunity a resequenceable matter?3 o One is
tempted to say, at least, that defenses like res judicata or the statute of
limitations are too much on the merits to resequence. But then one
confronts the argument that even the merits should be resequenceable if the
merits and jurisdiction intertwine.' 3 ' Where is the line, if one exists at all?
One might think that no line will ever hold, that there is no logical
stopping point in the expansion of the list of resequenceable grounds since
the Steel Co. decision. But if the list were to expand into the merits, the
Steel Co. rule would promptly unravel. We would be back where we
started: a court could decide issues in any sequence, although the resulting
judgment would be exposed to the normal avenues for relief from
judgment, including collateral attack on subject-matter jurisdiction
grounds. The nonbypassability rule would disappear, and hypothetical
jurisdiction would no longer operate.132
In other words, if Steel Co. calls for an ever-expanding list, then Steel
Co. carries the seeds of its own destruction,133 much like the fate of other
Calderon v. Ashmus, 523 U.S. 740, 745 (1998) (suggesting that subject matter-jurisdiction must
come before an Eleventh Amendment immunity determination).
Foreign sovereign immunity may be different because more people see it in more contexts as
partly a matter of subject-matter jurisdiction. See GARY B. BORN & PETER B. RUTLEDGE,
INTERNATIONAL CIvL LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES COURTS 66-72 (4th ed. 2007); cf Kao Hwa
Shipping Co. v. China Steel Corp., 816 F. Supp. 910, 917-18 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (allowing relief
from default judgment on the ground of foreign sovereign immunity). Thus, it could be
nonbypassable and yet not resequenceable.
129. See Rutledge, supra note 5, at 44-46 (arguing that the law should change to bring the act-
of-state defense into the resequenceable group because not doing so gives settlement leverage to
plaintiffs, increases judicial investment of resources, and retards development of legal glosses on
the defense).
130. See ARTHUR D. HELLMAN, LAuREN K. ROBEL & DAVID R. STRAs, FEDERAL COURTS 540-
41 (2d ed. 2009) (posing the question for qualified immunity).
131. See Long Term Care Partners, LLC v. United States, 516 F.3d 225, 232-33 (4th Cir.
2008); Joshua Schwartz, Note, Limiting Steel Co.: Recapturing a Broader "Arising Under"
Jurisdictional Question, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 2255,2260 (2004) (arguing that dismissal for lack of
a federal cause of action should be deemed quasi-jurisdictional and hence resequenceable).
132. See supra note 102 (explaining how validity works in the absence of hypothetical
jurisdiction). Of course, the system could alternatively take the radical step of removing subject-
matter jurisdiction as a requirement for a valid judgment. See Moore, supra note 73, at 549, 562;
Note, supra note 57, at 164-65, 222-23.
133. See Friedenthal, supra note 32, at 270-75; Evan Tsen Lee, The Dubious Concept of
Jurisdiction, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 1613, 1614, 1631 (2003) (arguing that "there is no hard conceptual
difference between jurisdiction and the merits" and "when faced with the truly extraordinary case,
the lower federal court judge knows that he or she can rule on the merits in the absence of
jurisdiction"); Viavant, supra note44, at 571-72; cf Frederic M. Bloom, Jurisdiction 's Noble Lie,
61 STAN. L. REv. 971 (2009) (detailing other difficulties of the "jurisdiction" term); Jay Tidmarsh,
Resolving Cases "On the Merits," 87 DENv. U. L. REV. 407, 409-13 (2010) (detailing other
difficulties of the "merits" term).
2011]1 327
sequencing rules.' 34 Therefore, a line must be drawn. As long as the Court
wants to allow federal courts to purposefully skip subject-matter
jurisdiction for easier and surer decisions with binding effect on certain
threshold matters, it must not extend the permission to decisions on the
merits.
True, Chicot stands for the proposition that a court without subject-
matter jurisdiction can give a binding decision on the merits as long as the
court thought it had subject-matter jurisdiction or the parties failed to raise
an objection to subject-matter jurisdiction.135 But as Steel Co. necessarily
said, a court cannot purposefully skip subject-matterjurisdiction to dismiss
on the merits.136 In that sense, the case's nonbypassability rule represents a
limit on Chicot, just as it was the price for approving hypothetical
jurisdiction. Moreover, Steel Co. was a rejection of the alternative route
of allowing the court to dismiss on the merits but giving the decision no
preclusive effect at all as to validity.138 In effect, Steel Co., as elaborated by
Ruhrgas, was a compromise between those two views: making
hypothetical jurisdiction too widely available in support of preclusion after
the judge discretionarily sequences the defenses or prohibiting hypothetical
jurisdiction altogether.
Therein lies the key to understanding resequenceability. The
compromise allows hypothetical jurisdiction only for disposition on
nonmerits grounds, giving that decision the strictly circumscribed
preclusive effect prescribed for the jurisdiction-to-determine-no-
jurisdiction doctrine. To get rid of the case at the threshold in a way that
precludes only the threshold issue, allowing the plaintiff to correct the
threshold defect in a second suit, is desirable. By contrast, there is no
reason to allow exercise of hypothetical jurisdiction in away that precludes
the merits, especially in the possible absence of subject-matterjurisdiction.
Moreover, it would not be feasible to give a strictly circumscribed
preclusive effect to a decision on the merits because if it gets any
preclusive effect, it will kill the cause of action.
The rule that emerges is not a compromise made only for the sake of
compromise. It is a rule that makes defensible policy sense. Assuming one
has decided that the first step down the Ruhrgas path is a sound step, the
compromise gives the judge a reasonable zone of freedom of action at the
threshold. Yet it tells the judge that to dispose of a claim in a preclusive
way on the merits, the judge first has to make sure that the jurisdictional
134. See, e.g., Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808, 820-21 (2009) (undercutting the former
sequencing rule of Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 197 (2001) (treating qualified immunity)).
135. See supra text accompanying notes 51 & 72 (explaining the Chicot doctrine).
136. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 93-102 (1998).
137. See supra text accompanying notes 51-59 (explaining the rationale of the
nonbypassability list).
138. See supra text accompanying note 103 (explaining the unsatisfactoriness of this route).
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ducks are in a row. Otherwise, hypothetical subject-matter jurisdiction will
be unavailable to insulate the judgment from later attack.
With the contours of that Steel Co.-Ruhrgas compromise finally
exposed, the decisional grounds for which a court may purposefully skip
over a challenge to subject-matterjurisdiction become apparent. The length
of the list should not turn on some abstract notion like "essentiality" of the
grounds to the judicial process.139 Instead, the law should draw the line in
practical terms, by looking to when a court possibly lacking subject-matter
jurisdiction should be able to give a binding decision on a defense. The
court should not be able to bypass and dismiss when the effect is to kill the
cause of action, but only when the plaintiff has a chance to avoid or correct
the defect. The law already specifies when a plaintiff normally can start
over after a contested dismissal. Accordingly, resequenceability should
look to the line that res judicata already draws-with fair clarity-when it
declines to create a bar to reassertion of the claim after an adjudication "not
on the merits."1 40 Thus, the list of resequenceable grounds should include
only those defenses that could result in decisions not on the merits, in the
claim-preclusive sense.141
On the one hand, the settled Steel Co.-Ruhrgas line of precedent-
139. See Idleman, supra note 20, at 12-13, 74-75 (criticizing an essentiality test arguably
suggested by Ruhrgas).
140. See ROBERT C. CASAD & KEVIN M. CLERMONT, RES JUDICATA: A HANDBOOK ON ITS
THEORY, DOCTRINE, AND PRACTICE 98-99 (2001). As Professor Robert Casad and I explain:
Certain dismissals not on the merits remain exceptions to the rule of bar,
namely: (1) dismissals for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction or territorial
jurisdiction, improper venue, inadequate notice, or nonjoinder or misjoinder of
parties; (2) most dismissals for prematurity of suit or failure to satisfy a
precondition to suit; and (3) most voluntary dismissals. Moreover, unless
prohibited by statute or rule, the court in the first action can specify that its
dismissal is not to act as a bar; and the court in the second action will defer to that
specification.
Other dismissals and judgments, which are perhaps not in any real sense on
the merits but which were preceded by an ample opportunity for the plaintiff to
litigate the claim, have of late come within the rule of bar, at least in the view of
many courts and legislatures. Examples include: (1) a dismissal for failure to state
a claim; (2) a summary judgment, judgment on partial findings, or judgment as a
matter of law and other decisions squarely on the merits; and (3) a dismissal for
failure to prosecute or to obey a court order or rule, even though it is not in any
real sense on the merits.
Id.
141. A dismissal for failure to prosecute or to obey a court order or rule might have presented a
special problem for this formulation had not the Court already solved it. See Willy v. Coastal Corp.,
503 U.S. 131, 134, 139 (1992) (upholding imposition of FED. R. Civ. P. 11 sanctions even in a case
dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction). Thus, a court can proceed directly to a
disciplinary dismissal, which then will have normal claim-preclusive effects because subject-matter
jurisdiction for discipline exists.
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which lists justiciability, jurisdiction, abstention, exhaustion, class
certification, and venue as resequenceable grounds-conforms to this test.
Dispositions on such grounds do not create a bar to a new action when the
plaintiff avoids or corrects the defect.142
On the other hand, the disputed matters of sovereign immunity, act of
state, and qualified immunity should not be resequenceable: to bypass
subj ect-matter jurisdiction and give a preclusive decision on such a defense
kills the cause of action on the merits, as opposed to merely deciding some
threshold issue that normally does not create a bar.14 Likewise, the
intuition that other defenses are not resequenceable seems sound: resjudicata and even the statute of limitationsl 45 are sufficiently on the
merits in a claim-preclusive sense. Finally, the jurisdiction/merits divider
persists in the law of claim preclusion: a dismissal for lack ofjurisdiction
is not treated as being on the merits, no matter how intertwined with the
merits it might be, while a dismissal for failure to state a claim is now
treated as being on the merits.146 Although there may be very good policy
reasons to reach some of these issues early,147 there is no reason to extend
hypothetical subject-matter jurisdiction to them. An important insight is
that one should not compose the list with the policies of efficient
sequencing in mind but instead with a focus on when we wish to extend a
preclusive effect to the decided defense even in the possible absence of
federal subject-matter jurisdiction.
In sum, and as suggested at the outset, the list of resequenceable
threshold matters is not the same as, and is in fact much longer than, the
list of fundamental matters that a federal court cannot bypass. With the
logic behind resequencing exposed, I am much more comfortable in
specifying the two lists:
Nonbvpassable Defenses Resequenceable Defenses
i.e., defenses the court i.e., defenses on which the court can
cannot skip over to dismiss decide without first deciding
on the merits nonbypassable defenses
142. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 20 (1982).
143. See id. §§ 19-20.
144. See Hartmann v. Time, Inc., 166 F.2d 127, 138-40 (3d Cir. 1947); Bronstein v.
Kalcheim, 467 N.E.2d 979, 982-83 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984).
145. See CASAD & CLERMONT, supra note 140, at 93-96.
146. See supra note 60 (discussing the jurisdiction/merits divider in the similar, but not
necessarily identical, context of validity).
147. See, e.g., supra note 129 (discussing act of state).
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Article M justiciability; other justiciability and jurisdiction;
subject-matter jurisdiction abstention; exhaustion; class
certification; venue; anything else not
on the merits in the claim-preclusive
sense
5. Discretion to Resequence
Once the court decides that an asserted defense is resequenceable, then
the court must decide whether to decide it first. Normally, the court will
still decide subject-matter jurisdiction first in light of Steel Co., but
Ruhrgas frees the court to decide the other defense if that path is easier or
surer, or if it serves other institutional interests.14 8 But that discretion is not
my concern in this Part. Here, I am interested in a rule that forbids
discretionary sequencing and, incidentally, how uncertainty about the
scope of the rule might affect the court's exercise of that discretion.
C. Summary
Today, upon a challenge to Article III justiciability or subject-matter
jurisdiction, a federal court cannot avoid the challenge by dismissing on
the merits, but the court may invoke hypothetical jurisdiction to sustain any
nonmerits defense with preclusive effect as to that defense. In other words,
the court should normally decide a defense of subject-matterjurisdiction at
the outset of the case. Such a fundamental ground is nonbypassable. But if
the defendant challenges the existence of some other threshold jurisdiction-
like requirement, the court has discretion to act as if it has subject-matter
jurisdiction and decide on the basis of that other defect. Thus, relying on
hypothetical jurisdiction over the subject matter, the court can resequence
to render a binding determination on the lack of, say, personal jurisdiction
or forum non conveniens.
Nonbypassability has obvious sequencing implications for judicial
decisionmaking because courts must decide in a certain order under that
regime. It is indeed the law's foremost limitation on the courts' power to
sequence. But upon close examination, the nonbypassability rule proves to
be quite narrow, and the exception of resequenceability quite broad. Thus,
this foremost sequencing limitation turns out not to be a major constraint,
except perhaps as it lacks clarity.
To the extent that courts are uncertain of the reach of the
nonbypassability rule, but wish to avoid reversal, they will follow it even
when it does not apply. Likewise, courts might be uncertain as to the list of
resequenceable grounds or as to the workings of hypothetical jurisdiction.
The result will be an unwillingness to avoid jurisdictional questions.
148. See Idleman, supra note 20, at 14-20.
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Steel Co.-Ruhrgas is a good doctrine when properly limited. To the
extent that confusion creates a broader constraint, the constraint is
undesirable. The above-given attention to the precise meaning of the
doctrine reduced the current fog. Ideally, the doctrine should prove, in
future actual practice, to be a fairly minimal constraint on courts'
sequencing power.
III. INTRASUIT PRECLUSION
A. Jury-Judge Sequencing
The middle of the last century saw a series of famous cases in which the
Supreme Court reconciled the merger of law and equity with the Seventh
Amendment and through which the Court greatly expanded the scope of
the jury right.149 In the process, the Court created a sequencing rule under
which a federal courtis must give first to the jury a factual issue common
to the merits of a law claim and an equity claim joined in the same case.
Given those special conditions, to say nothing of the rarity of trial,' this
rule has only occasional application.
1. Cases
Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westoverl52 was the first of those cases. It
involved a dispute between movie theaters over the exclusive right to show
movies in the competitive area for a time period specified in a contractual
"clearance." In essence, Fox sued Beacon in equity for an injunction, and
Beacon counterclaimed at law for treble damages under the antitrust laws.
The two claims had a common issue concerning whether the Fox and
Beacon theaters were in competition even though they were more than ten
149. See generally RICHARD H. FIELD, BENJAMIN KAPLAN & KEVIN M. CLERMONT, MATERIALS
FOR A BASIC COURSE IN CIVIL PROCEDURE 1495-527 (10th ed. 2010); 9 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT &
ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2302.1 (3d ed. 2008).
150. Although the Supreme Court has held most of the rights in the Bill of Rights to be
fundamental enough for the Fourteenth Amendment to guarantee against invasion by the states, the
Seventh Amendment right to a civil jury has not been one of those. See, e.g., Walker v. Sauvinet, 92
U.S. 90,92 (1876); Melancon v. McKeithen, 345 F. Supp. 1025, 1027 (E.D. La. 1972), aff'dmem.
sub nom. Davis v. Edwards, 409 U.S. 1098 (1973), and Hill v. McKeithen, 409 U.S. 943 (1972),
and Mayes v. Ellis, 409 U.S. 943 (1972). That is to say, the Seventh Amendment applies to actions
in the federal courts, but not to state-court actions. But cf McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct.
3020, 3035 n.13 (2010) (throwing the old cases into doubt and opening the door slightly to
incorporating the Seventh Amendment). Moreover, the Supreme Court's interpretation of the
Seventh Amendment has had little persuasive influence on state courts. See FIELD ETAL., supra note
149, at 1510-11.
151. See Kevin M. Clermont, Litigation Realities Redux, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1919, 1956-
61 (2009) (showing that the trial rate has dropped nearly to 1% of filed federal cases).
152. 359 U.S. 500 (1959).
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miles apart. Beacon wanted a jury trial.153 As a historical matter, an equity
court had discretion whether to proceed in these circumstances or to defer
to the later-commenced law action on the thought that the legal remedy
was adequate.154 Accordingly, the district court chose to decide the equity
claim first, without a jury, and the court of appeals assented.' The
Supreme Court, in an opinion written by Justice Hugo Black, reversed.156
First, the Court's all-important premise was that whichever
determination on the common issue of law and equity came first-be it by
judge or by jury-would preclude the second determination. 5 7 Here is that
premise:
Thus the effect of the action of the District Court could be, as
the Court of Appeals believed, "to limit the petitioner's
opportunity fully to try to a jury every issue which has a
bearing upon its treble damage suit," for determination of the
issue of clearances by the judge might "operate either by way
of res judicata or collateral estoppel so as to conclude both
parties with respect thereto at the subsequent trial of the treble
damage claim."158
The Court, in fact, neglected to cite anything for this res judicata point. But
as to preclusion between law and equity, the Court was right.15 Because
the old courts administered law and equity in separate suits, preclusion still
applied between them according to the ordinary rules of res judicata.
Second, the Court reasoned that to circumvent preclusion, the trial
153. Id. at 502-04.
154. See Am. Life Ins. Co. v. Stewart, 300 U.S. 203,215-16 (1937); FIELD ET AL., supra note
149, at 1493-95.
155. Beacon Theatres, 359 U.S. at 503-05.
156. Id. at 511.
157. See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322,334 (1979); David L. Shapiro & Daniel
R. Coquillette, The Fetish ofJury Trial in Civil Cases: A Comment on Rachal v. Hill, 85 HARv. L.
REv. 442, 446 (1971).
158. Beacon Theatres, 359 U.S. at 504 (quoting Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 252 F.2d
864, 874 (9th Cir. 1958)). The Supreme Court was quoting the court of appeals, which actually had
said,
Petitioner is correct in saying that if this issue be first tried and determined by the
court in its proposed first trial the determination of that issue by the court will
operate either by way of res judicata or collateral estoppel so as to conclude both
parties with respect thereto at the subsequent trial of the treble damage claim.
Beacon Theatres, 252 F.2d at 874. The court of appeals cited Bruckman v. Holizer for this
proposition but, nevertheless, held that the district judge could discretionarily try the equitable
claim first. Id. at 874-75 (citing Bruckman v. Holizer, 152 F.2d 730, 732 (9th Cir. 1946)).
159. See Parklane Hosiery, 439 U.S. at 334; Brady v. Daly, 175 U.S. 148, 161 (1899);
RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTs § 68 cmt. j (1942). Such preclusion prevailed not only in 1959 but
also in 1791. See Shapiro & Coquillette, supra note 157, at 450-54.
2011]1 333
judge could invoke his or her sequencing discretion.160 The judge should
exercise such discretion in the light of current procedural realities-"not by
precedents decided under discarded procedures, but in the light of the
remedies now made available."'61 In a merged system, the legal remedy,
because it no longer required a separate action, had become an adequate
remedy. Equity could await the trial of the common law claim. The judge
could try the issue first to the jury without any disadvantage to the parties.
Third, the Court ruled that preclusion of ajury by a prior determination
in the same suit would normally violate the Seventh Amendment.' 62
Therefore, the judge now must proceed in the order ofjury decision on the
common issue coming first. Note that the Court did not fashion a general
principle that the jury must go first on common issues. Instead, it ruled that
a court cannot choose to conduct a single suit in a way that would defeat
the jury right. Accordingly, its holding applies only when intrasuit
preclusion is actually in play.
The Court's three-step reasoning is obscure to modem minds. It bears
repeating that the Court saw its task as preserving the jury right in an
altered procedural system. It thought that res judicata would apply in a
single suit if, and only if, the parties would have brought separate suits in
1791: in those circumstances, a prior jury determination would bind the
judge, just as a prior judge determination would bind the jury. The Court
manipulated history, without disregarding it, by finding equity to have
possessed discretion in the old days and merely directing how modem
chancellors should exercise it. The Seventh Amendment, because it
favored the jury trial right over the judge trial right, requires modem courts
to use their new procedural discretion in a way to avoid that preclusion of
the jury. However, the Court did hedge a bit:
If there should be cases where the availability of
declaratory judgment or joinder in one suit of legal and
equitable causes would not in all respects protect the plaintiff
seeking equitable relief from irreparable harm while affording
a jury trial in the legal cause, the trial court will necessarily
have to use its discretion in deciding whether the legal or
equitable cause should be tried first. Since the right to jury
trial is a constitutional one, however, while no similar
requirement protects trials by the court, that discretion is very
narrowly limited and must, wherever possible, be exercised to
preserve jury trial.... This long-standing principle of equity
dictates that only under the most imperative circumstances,
circumstances which in view of the flexible procedures of the
160. Beacon Theatres, 359 U.S. at 510-11.
161. Id. at 507.
162. See id. at 510-11 (prohibiting that "the right to ajury trial of legal issues be lost through
prior determination").
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Federal Rules we cannot now anticipate, can the right to a
jury trial of legal issues be lost through prior determination of
equitable claims.163
These hesitancies evaporated three years later when the Court, in
another opinion written by Justice Black, decided Dairy Queen, Inc. v.
Wood.16 In that case, the plaintiff had joined equitable and legal claims for
relief. The defendant wanted a jury trial.' 65 As a historical matter, an equity
court had no discretion as to the common issues, because the plaintiff
could have denied the defendant a jury right on them by suing initially in
equity only.166 Accordingly, the district court denied the request for ajury,
and the court of appeals assented.167 But again, the Supreme Court
reversed. 168
With a strong pro-jury bias, the Court simply lifted the bare holding of
Beacon Theatres and applied it without regard to its context. The Dairy
Queen Court said that "in a case such as this where there cannot even be a
contention of such 'imperative circumstances,' Beacon Theatres requires
that any legal issues for which a trial by jury is timely and properly
demanded be submitted to a jury."l 69 It closed:
We conclude therefore that the district judge erred in
refusing to grant petitioner's demand for a trial by jury on the
factual issues related to the question of whether there has been
a breach of contract. Since these issues are common with
those upon which respondents' claim to equitable relief is
based, the legal claims involved in the action must be
determined prior to any final court determination of
respondents' equitable claims.170
With Beacon Theatres cut free of its moorings in reason, virtually no
subsequent cases have found imperative circumstances to avoid applying
its rule. '" The rule applies without regard to historical restrictions or
163. Id. at 510-11; see John C. McCoid, II, Procedural Reform and the Right to Jury Trial: A
Study ofBeacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 116 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 4-5 (1967).
164. 369 U.S. 469, 470 (1962).
165. Id. at 475-76.
166. See generally FIELD ET AL., supra note 149, at 1490; FLEMING JAMES, JR., GEOFFREY C.
HAZARD, JR. & JOHN LEUBSDORF, CIVIL PROCEDURE 515-20 (5th ed. 2001).
167. Dairy Queen, 369 U.S. at 470.
168. Id. at 479-80.
169. Id. at 473.
170. Id. at 479.
171. See Cabinet Vision v. Cabnetware, 129 F.3d 595, 600 (Fed. Cir. 1997) ("Accordingly,
whatever discretion exists to override a jury's fact finding in such situations, this discretion is
reviewed carefully."); 9 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 149, § 2338, at 370 (concluding that it is
"highly doubtful that there are any circumstances that would qualify"). But see W. Geophysical Co.
of Am. v. Bolt Assocs., Inc., 440 F.2d 765, 772 (2d Cir. 1971); Holiday Inns of Am., Inc. v. Lussi,
42 F.R.D. 27, 32 (N.D.N.Y. 1967).
2011] 335
FLORIDA LAWREVIEW
current circumstances. Even if the trial court dismisses the legal claim for
reliefjoined by the plaintiff with an equitable claim for relief, and then the
court tries the equitable claim without the jury requested by the plaintiff,
the same rule applies: when the appellate court finds the dismissal to have
been in error, the trial court must retry the common issues to ajury first.172
2. Consequences
As one consequence, today the strict sequencing rule is that a federal
court must, upon request for ajury, first try to the jury any issue common
to joined legal and equitable claims for relief'7 3 The joinder might be by
the plaintiff joining multiple claims for relief, or it might result from the
defendant asserting a defense or counterclaim that, in the old days, could
have stood as a separate claim. As another consequence, a preclusion rule
provides that the jury's decision will bind the judge on the common
issue. 74
Where does this preclusion rule come from? It does not come from res
judicata, which, as all the hornbooks say,17 5 applies only between separate
176 17
suits.1 It rests solely on the Seventh Amendment's historical approach: 7
172. Lytle v. Household Mfg., Inc., 494 U.S. 545, 551-54 (1990).
173. See Shum v. Intel Corp., 499 F.3d 1272, 1276-79 (Fed. Cir. 2007); LARRY L. TEPLY &
RALPH U. WHITTEN, CivIL PROCEDURE 886-87 (3d ed. 2004); 9 WRIGHT& MILLER, supra note 149,
§§ 2305, at 125 & n.21, 2338, at 368 & n.10.
174. Int'l Fin. Servs. Corp. v. Chromas Techs. Can., Inc., 356 F.3d 731, 735, 738 n.1 (7th Cir.
2004); Todd v. Ortho Biotech, Inc. 138 F.3d 733, 738 (8th Cir.) ("[T]he jury's finding on an issue
common to both claims is in any event conclusive...."), vacatedon other grounds, 525 U.S. 802,
802 (1998); Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass'n, 108 F.3d 1431, 1440 (D.C. Cir. 1997) ("As our sister
circuits have uniformly held in cases involving allegations of intentional discrimination, the district
court must therefore follow the jury's factual findings with respect to a plaintiff's legal claims when
later ruling on claims for equitable relief."), modified on reh'g, 139 F.3d 958 (D.C. Cir. 1998),
vacated on other grounds, 527 U.S. 526, 546 (1999); JAMES ET AL., supra note 166, at 528.
175. See, e.g., CASAD & CLERMONT, supra note 140, at 7-8; JAMES ET AL., supra note 166, at
677; TEPLY & WHITTEN, supra note 173, at 944-45; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
JUDGMENTS ch. 1, at 1 (1982).
176. See FIELD ET AL., supra note 149, at 688.
The doctrine of res judicata specifies certain binding effects, in subsequent
litigation, of a previously rendered judgment. Generally speaking, then, res
judicata can apply only when an attempt is made in a second action to foreclose
relitigation of a matter already adjudicated in a previous action. Res judicata
therefore has no application to an attempt in the original action at correcting error
in the judgment, as by motion for a new trial or by appeal.
Id.
177. Such preclusion outside the traditional confines of res judicata is not unique. Another
special kind of preclusion can apply within the same suit: jurisdiction-to-determine-jurisdiction
applies to preclude a direct attack on validity by a motion for relief from judgment. See, e.g.,
Nemaizer v. Baker, 793 F.2d 58, 64-66 (2d Cir. 1986) (involving FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b)). The
special doctrine ofjurisdiction-to-determine-jurisdiction springs from sources different from those
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because in 1791 the legal and equitable claims would have been separate
suits, we should apply intrasuit preclusion between jury and judge in order
to preserve the jury right as it was. Therefore, being an aspect ofjury right,
and not part of res judicata, this special kind of jury-judge preclusion has
no broader application than factual issues common to joined legal and
equitable claims.
Where does that sequencing rule come from? It follows from the
Seventh Amendment's special preclusion rule, aimed at protecting the jury
right. Therefore, it too has no broader application than factual issues
common to joined legal and equitable claims.
Of course, one could say that the jury precedents will come to apply
without any regard to their reasoning, much as Dairy Queen extended
Beacon Theatres. But that outcome is unlikely now that the jury mania of
the 1960s has passed.'7 8 Beacon Theatres-Dairy Queen was a product of its
time, and now the Court would probably not adopt it as a matter of first
impression. We accordingly need to excavate the Court's train of reasoning
and respect the restraints inherent therein.
The restrained view of Beacon Theatres-Dairy Queen helps to explain
the Court's later decision in Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore.17 In that case,
the Supreme Court held that a prior equitable decree could preclude the
defendant in a subsequent law action brought by a new plaintiff.s 0 On the
one hand, this result is consistent with the law ofresjudicata, which allows
equity-law preclusion.18' It is indeed consistent with the view that res
judicata adjusts to any procedural changes and so an expanded notion of
res judicata can apply in new situations despite old procedural limitations.
Just as merged procedure caused claim preclusion to extend to a plaintiff
who sues on either the legal or the equitable part of a claim without the
other part,182 nonmutual collateral estoppel could leap the equity/law
divide to defeat a defendant's jury right in an action by a new plaintiff. On
of claim and issue preclusion. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
Other preclusion-related rules might stem from the Seventh Amendment. Some courts have
posited that in a bifurcated trial, the second jury cannot reconsider the first jury's finding without
violating the Re-examination Clause of the Seventh Amendment. See, e.g., Castano v. Am. Tobacco
Co., 84 F.3d 734, 751 (5th Cir. 1996) (citing In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1302-
03 (7th Cir. 1995)); Lucas Watkins, How States Can Protect Their Policies in Federal Class
Actions, 32 CAMPBELL L. REV. 285, 307-08 (2010); cf 7B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 9, § 1801, at
272-73 (discussing the analogous partial-certification problem). But see Joshua P. Davis & Eric L.
Cramer, Antitrust, Class Certification, and the Politics ofProcedure, 17 GEO. MASON L. REv. 969,
975, 1019-28 (2010). These courts further conclude that to protect the jury right in the second
phase, the issues in the two phases need to be distinct and separable. Cimino v. Raymark Indus.,
Inc., 151 F.3d 297, 320 (5th Cir. 1998).
178. See FIELD ET AL., supra note 149, at 1525-27.
179. 439 U.S. 322 (1979).
180. See id. at 335.
181. See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
182. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 25 cmt. i (1982).
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the other hand, the result is also consistent with the jury-judge sequencing
rule. Because that rule rests on the Seventh Amendment's dictate that in a
single suit the judge must use existing sequencing power to preserve the
jury right, it has no application to the Parklane situation of separate
lawsuits for which sequencing is not a possibility.'8 3 The Supreme Court
could have invented a wholly new rule of res judicata that provided for no
preclusion at the expense of the jury right in any setting whatsoever, but
the pro-jury motivation to invent had waned.
This view of Beacon Theatres-Dairy Queen is not only restrained but
also subtle. Lower courts can misunderstand it and, at least within a single
suit, think that the jury-judge sequencing rule applies more broadly than it
should.
The prime example of confusion involves issues common both to
jurisdiction and to the merits. Although there is no constitutional jury right
on jurisdictional issues,1 84 courts and commentators equivocate on whether
a jury must first determine any common issue.185 But they are wrong to
equivocate. Beacon Theatres-Dairy Queen applies only to issues common
to joined legal and equitable claims, not to issues common to jurisdiction
and the merits. The reason is that the preclusion premise of Beacon
Theatres-Dairy Queen rested on preclusion between separate law and
equity suits. Preclusion never extended to decisions on jurisdiction that
foreclosed later consideration of the merits in the same suit. 86 Because
there would be no preclusion, there is no need to invert matters by a
sequence that would have the jury consider the merits before the judge
could decide the common issue involved in the dispute over jurisdiction.
Therefore, the judge can decide jurisdiction at the outset, and the jury can
decide anew the common issue at the regular trial.
B. Foreclosure
Concern about preclusion in violation of the Seventh Amendment
generated Beacon Theatres-Dairy Queen. But as shown above, its
183. See Lytle v. Household Mfg., Inc., 494 U.S. 545, 550-54 (1990).
184. See Steven Kessler, Note, The Right to a Jury Trialfor Jurisdictional Issues, 6 CARDOZO
L. REv. 149, 149 (1984); Note, Trial by Jury ofPreliminary Jurisdictional Facts in Federal Courts,
48 IOWA L. REv. 471 (1963) (arguing that jurisdiction is an issue collateral to the merits and so no
jury right exists); cf Ronald J. Allen & Michael S. Pardo, The Myth ofthe Law-Fact Distinction, 97
Nw. U. L. REv. 1769, 1771 (2003) ("[T]he decision to label an issue 'law' or 'fact' is a functional
one based on who should decide it under what standard, and is not based on the nature of the
issue.").
185. See, e.g., Friedman v. Wilson Freight Forwarding Co., 181 F. Supp. 327, 329 (W.D. Pa.
1960) (saying there is a jury right "where the jurisdictional question ofjoint venture is closely tied
to the merits"); Kessler, supra note 184, at 165-66; Note, supra note 184, at 480-81, 489.
186. Some statutes expressly so provide. See, e.g., 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-301(b) (2005);
TEx. R. Civ. P. 120a(2); cf Clermont, supra note 16, at 990-91 (arguing additionally against
preclusion because the standard of proof for jurisdiction is less demanding than the standard
applicable to the merits).
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sequencing rule does not extend beyond the narrow context of factual
issues common to joined legal and equitable claims. The question now
becomes whether other concerns about foreclosure later in the same suit
have generated sequencing rules applicable in other contexts.
1. Res Judicata
Here the answer is fairly simple. No further sequencing rules arise from
concerns about actual preclusion in the same suit because there is no
intrasuit res judicata (as oposed to some separate doctrine such as Beacon
Theatres-Dairy Queen).1
The cases conform to that view. Besides jurisdiction, judges must
decide other preliminary matters that overlap matters destined later to go
before the ultimate decisionmaker. For example, some evidentiary rulings
involve issues common with the merits:
Consider the co[-]conspirator exception to the hearsay rule as
it operates in a criminal conspiracy case. To establish that a
hearsay exception applies, the proponent of evidence must, by
a preponderance of the evidence, show that the prerequisites
for the exception have been established. . . . But if the
substantive charge is conspiracy, that means that the court
must in effect find that defendant is guilty of conspiracy (by a
preponderance of the evidence) before admitting this
evidence, which the jury must evaluate, along with all the
other evidence, in determining whether defendant has been
proved guilty of conspiracy beyond a reasonable doubt. Thejudge does not, of course, tell the jury that she has already
concluded that defendant is guilty, albeit only by a
preponderance ofte evidence, and defendant's right to ajury
trial is preserved.
Therefore, no corrective sequencing rule for evidentiary rulings is
necessary.
In one of the more exotic rulings, Pavey v. Conley, the Seventh Circuit
faced a situation in which the same factual issue, the severity of injury, was
germane both to the preliminary inquiry of whether the prisoner had
exhausted his administrative remedies and to the merits of the case.' 89 The
district court had held that the prisoner possessed a jury trial right on any
factual issues relating to whether he had exhausted the administrative
remedies, and so it had delayed determination of the defense until trial. The
court of appeals ruled that the judge should decide on exhaustion and do so
at the outset, but the ultimate factfinder could revisit the judge's
determination. The court reasoned that, "if there is ajury trial, the jury will
187. See supra note 178 and accompanying text.
188. Richard Marcus, Reviving Judicial Gatekeeping ofAggregation: Scrutinizing the Merits
on Class Certification, 79 GEO. WAsH. L. REV. 324, 365-66 (2011).
189. 544 F.3d 739, 740-41 (7th Cir. 2008).
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make all necessary findings of fact without being bound by (or even
informed of) any of the findings made by the district judge in determining
that the prisoner had exhausted his administrative remedies."' 9 0
The most common setting in which courts overtly discuss this problem
is class certification. By now it should be clear how the Hydrogen Peroxide
case could say: "Although the district court's findings for the purpose of
class certification are conclusive on that topic, they do not bind the fact-
finder on the merits."l91 All the cases on this point seem to say the same on
preclusion. 9 2
Against all the case law, one could argue that because class actions
were equitable in origin, and onl equity could entertain a class action even
when its merits were all legal,' we have fallen back into the context of
issues common to joined legal and equitable claims.194 But the class-action
situation is different from joinder of legal and equitable claims. Although
class actions were originally all equitable, the Supreme Court has ruled that
the jury right will be determined separately for certification and for the
merits: the former remains equitable, with decision by the judge, while the
latter might be "legal," with a jury right.195 The certification and the merits
nonetheless have always been part of one case, not to be pursued in
separate law and equity suits, and hence with no room for the application
of res judicata between the class action's equitable and legal parts. With
the Beacon Theatres-Dairy Queen premise of preclusion therefore not
kicking in, there is no sequencing conclusion. The court can decide the
certification issues first, and the ultimate factfinder, be it judge or jury, will
be free to reconsider any common issues.
Alternatively, opponents of the case law on class certification could
argue that the denial of preclusion is inefficient or even unfair. The idea is
that the court should not have to try the same question twice, and the
victorious party should not have to undergo that expense and risk.
Moreover, retrying an issue creates the risk of inconsistent determinations,
which can be thorny when emanating from the same suit. The difficulty
190. Id. at 742.
191. In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 318 (3d Cir. 2008).
192. See id. at 318 n.19 (citing cases); In re Initial Pub. Offerings Sec. Litig., 471 F.3d 24, 41
(2d Cir. 2006) ("[D]etermination as to a Rule 23 requirement is made only for purposes of class
certification and is not binding on the trier of facts, even if that trier is the class certification judge."
(citing Gariety v. Grant Thornton, LLP, 368 F.3d 356, 366 (4th Cir. 2004))), clarified, 483 F.3d 70
(2d Cir. 2007); Unger v. Amedisys, Inc., 401 F.3d 316, 323 (5th Cir. 2005); Gariety v. Grant
Thornton, LLP, 368 F.3d 356, 366 (4th Cir. 2004); AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF
AGGREGATE LmGATION § 2.06(b) (2010); Marcus, supra note 188; Olson, supra note 3, at 964-65.
193. See FIELD ET AL., supra note 149, at 1493.
194. See Davis & Cramer, supra note 177, at 1011-12 (arguing that a certification ruling
would preclude the jury and so violate the Seventh Amendment); Michael J. Kaufman & John M.
Wunderlich, The Unjustified Judicial Creation of Class Certification Merits Trials in Securities
Fraud Actions, 43 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 323, 357-60 (2010) (same).
195. See Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 540-41 (1970); 7B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 9,
§ 1801.
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this argument runs into, aside from any potential Seventh Amendment
concerns, is once again that there simply is no doctrine of intrasuit res
judicata to do the work. If one wants to pursue such policies relating to
efficiency and fairness, the most promising route involves resorting to the
already applicable doctrine called law of the case.196
2. Law of the Case
A doctrine that bears some resemblance both to res judicata and to stare
decisis is the law-of-the-case doctrine.' 97 Despite its name, it now can
apply to rulings on fact as well as on law. It is similar to stare decisis98 in
that it applies rather flexibly, so that a court may revisit the ruling if
convinced there is good reason to do so. It is similar to res judicata in that
it applies narrowly, albeit in a different range. It does not apply beyond the
parties to the case in which the ruling was rendered.199 Indeed, the ruling
can be binding as the law of the case only during the later conduct of the
very case in which the ruling was made, that is, within the context of the
initial action. 200 It will not bind the parties, or anyone else, in later
proceedings that are not part of the same case.
Basically, the law-of-the-case doctrine means that a question once
actually resolved in the course of litigation will not lightly be reconsidered
at later stages in the same action, except by a higher court, even if the point
was erroneously decided:
Within a single lawsuit the general principles mentioned
[in connection with stare decisis and resjudicata]-desire for
consistency, desire to terminate litigation, desire to maintain
the prestige of courts-have some meaning. There is a feeling
that the various phases of a lawsuit should be consistent one
with another; that the same matter should not be the subject of
repetitious, time-consuming hearings; that public confidence
must be preserved in the judicial system by adhering to a
decision once made. These attitudes have been reflected in
numerous cases which have involved the "law of the case"
196. Other, less feasible routes include eliminating the overlapping threshold questions or
postponing them until trial. See Geoffrey P. Miller, Review of the Merits in Class Action
Certification, 33 HOFSTRA L. REv. 51, 55-59 (2004) (criticizing such "strong-form rules").
197. See generally 18B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §§ 4478-4478.6 (2d ed. 2002) (stressing the great development
of the doctrine of law of the case in recent times); cf Allan D. Vestal, Law of the Case: Single-Suit
Preclusion, 1967 UTAH L. REv. I (presenting an older and somewhat narrower view).
198. See generally Randy J. Kozel, Stare Decisis as Judicial Doctrine, 67 WASH. & LEE L.
REv. 411 (2010) (examining stare decisis as applied by the Supreme Court).
199. See 18B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 197, § 4478.5, at 809-14.
200. See id. § 4478, at 637-45.
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doctrine.20 1
This does not mean, of course, that the parties may not directly
challenge rulings by regular procedures, such as by appeal or by motion for
rehearing en banc. But if the ruling has withstood such direct challenges, as
for instance when a case has been appealed and remanded, or if the direct
challenge that might have been made was not, the ruling is said to have
become the law of that particular case and is ordinarily not subject to
reexamination.
There are many exceptions to the application of the rule of law of the
case. One may well question whether the interests of judicial economy
served by the doctrine are generally of such importance as to justify
holding parties to erroneous rulings that could still be corrected within the
framework of the same case. In view of the lesser justification of the law-
of-the-case doctrine, it is not surprising that courts have not applied it with
as much rigor and consistency as they have shown in connection with res
judicata. The doctrine, "as applied to the effect of previous orders on the
later action of the court rendering them in the same case, merely expresses
the practice of courts generally to refuse to reopen what has been decided,
not a limit to their power."202
In summary, the law-of-the-case doctrine, intended to foster judicial
economy, provides that a court (and any coordinate or lower courts as well)
will normally adhere to a ruling it has declared in a particular action when
a party later raises the point again in the same action. But this doctrine
applies very flexibly, so that the rendering court and coordinate courts can
revisit the ruling if convinced it was wrong or some other reason counsels
reconsideration. If so interpreted as mere maxims that a court will not
lightly redo what has been done and that lower courts must obey higher
courts, then the law-of-the-case doctrine expresses only the common sense
of "protecting against the agitation of settled issues"203 or "disciplined self-
consistency," and does some good and little harm.
Consider one last time the Hydrogen Peroxide setting of class
certification. As to the good the law-of-the-case doctrine accomplishes in
that setting, it says that any common issue's first determination will
normally stand, obviating the need for reconsideration. This normal
application will work to retrieve the efficiency and fairness that
reconsideration otherwise would put at risk.
The doctrine's constraint, however, is never really confining.
Accordingly, it will not always apply. In fact, the Seventh Amendment as
201. Vestal, supra note 197, at 1.
202. Messenger v. Anderson, 225 U.S. 436, 444 (1912).
203. Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 816 (1988) (quoting IB
JAMEs WM. MooRE, Jo DESHA LUCAS & THOMAS S. CURRIER, MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE
0.404[1], at 118 (2d ed. 1984)).
204. 18B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 197, § 4478, at 636.
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SEQUENCING THE ISSUES FOR JUDICIAL DECISIONMAKING
interpreted in Beacon Theatres-Dairy Queen dictates allowing the jury to
205
reconsider any issue on which a constitutional jury trial right exists.
More generally, the court retains the power to reconsider. Because of this
flexibility, the doctrine necessitates no sequencing rules. But because the
flexibility of the doctrine allows for reconsideration sometimes, it also
creates the risk of inconsistent decisions. That is the harm the doctrine
imposes.
What should be done when a later determination contradicts an earlier
determination?206 Except where the adjudicator has newly found
jurisdiction to be lacking,207 the judge need not go back and correct the
earlier decision, unless the judge thinks that undoing the earlier decision is
desirable. But clearly it would be best to minimize the occasion for
inconsistency, as by regularly relying on the law-of-the-case doctrine. An
alternative would be to rationalize away the inconsistency by construing
the "common" issues to be different after all or to be governed by different
standards or burdens of proof.208
C. Summary
Upon trial of a factual issue common to the merits of both law and
equity claims for relief joined in the same case, a federal court must give
the issue first to the jury for decision. The verdict will bind the judge with
respect to the equitable claim. These two consequences derive from the
Seventh Amendment.
Thus, this sequencing rule has a very limited range of application.
Although it applies if a case for, say, injunction and damages happens to
reach trial, it does not reach the situation of a judge deciding a threshold
issue like jurisdiction, class certification, or evidentiary admissibility. The
reason is that in these latter situations, there will be no intrasuit preclusion
and hence no requirement to go first to the jury.
Once again, however, the courts suffer from uncertainty about the reach
of this sequencing rule. Accordingly, they defer overly to fears of intruding
on the jury right. Efforts herein to dissipate the fog should pay dividends in
establishing the narrow limits of Beacon Theatres-Dairy Queen on courts'
sequencing power:
205. See supra text accompanying notes 163 & 170.
206. The question of which determination will have res judicata effect is not quite so difficult.
It would probably be the later one, either by operation of the essential-to-judgment requirement or
perhaps by analogy to the last-in-time rule. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §§ 15, 27
cmts. h, m (1982).
207. See, e.g., H.V. Allen Co. v. Quip-Matic, Inc., 266 S.E.2d 768, 769 (N.C. Ct. App.)
(reversing defendant's victory on the merits, while ordering dismissal for lack of long-arm
jurisdiction because defendant had made no contract), appeal dismissed, 273 S.E.2d 298,298 (N.C.
1980).
208. See generally Clermont, supra note 16, at 978-1000 (establishing that the standard of
proof for jurisdiction is less demanding than the standard applicable to the merits).
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Sequencing and Preclusion Law of the Case
in a case ofjoinder of legal and for all other intrasuit common
equitable claims for relief, the issues, there is no sequencing
common factual issues go first to rule, but then there is neither
the jury and then the verdict binds foreclosure of the jury nor any
the judge, both rules being by other foreclosure beyond the
virtue of the Seventh Amendment flexible law-of-the-case
doctrine
CONCLUSION
Courts in federal civil cases can sequence their decision of multiple
issues as they wish, except for the narrow Steel Co.-Ruhrgas and Beacon
Theatres-Dairy Queen rules. The former rule generally requires a federal
court to decide Article Ell justiciability and subject-matter jurisdiction
before ruling on the merits. The latter rule requires a federal trial judge to
give first to the jury a factual issue common to the merits of a law claim for
relief and an equity claim for relief joined in the same case.
In conjunction with sequencing, some special preclusion will result. On
the one hand, Article III justiciability and subject-matter jurisdiction will
most often enjoy preclusive effect in a subsequent suit, under the
jurisdiction-to-determine-jurisdiction doctrine for affirmative decisions or
the jurisdiction-to-determine-no-jurisdiction doctrine for negative
decisions, or by virtue of hypothetical jurisdiction for purposefully skipped
decisions. On the other hand, upon repetitive encounter of overlapping
matters in the same suit, the decisionmaker can reconsider its decision
without any intrasuit preclusion, except for the jury's Seventh Amendment
preclusion of the judge and except for the flexible restraint of the law-of-
the-case doctrine.
In the end, judges' broad power to sequence is probably desirable. At
the least, the narrow scope of the few limits on that power, as well as the
complexity and dissimilarity of those limits, stands as a challenge to any
limit's justification.
344 FLORIDA IAW RE VIEW [Vol. 63
